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NON-TECHNICAL SUMMARY
The paper presents an analysis of the GKO market which played an exceptional
role due to the its volume and its role for the government and investors during
the period of 1995-1998 (until the dramatic freezing of the GKO-OFZ market
on August 17, 1998). The authors have analyzed the stable period of
development of the GKO market in the period May 1996 - October 1997.
The authors have examined the structure of the GKO market itself and its
relations with other segments of the Russian financial market, such as currency
market (spot and forward), interbank credit market, currency futures market,
GKO futures market, stock market. They also study the relations of these
markets with the world financial market and compare the emerging Russian
financial market with the financial markets of industrial countries.
The degree of integration of markets or segments of the same market was
measured with the use of the correlation of the daily returns and the rate of
convergence of the daily returns.
Analysis of the daily data suggests the following conclusions.
We show that the structural stabilization of the Russian financial market and its
growing integration into the international capital flow in the period October
1997 - October 1997 was in progress. The heavy leaning of the GKO market on
nonresident portfolio investors determined the high sensitivity of the Russian
financial and currency markets to the «Asian» financial crisis in 1997-1998.
Outward rush of the foreign investors’ capital and withdrawal of their hard
currency profits gave rise to the sharply increasing indebtedness and to the
currency crisis. At the lowest point of the crisis the government made a
decision to freeze and restructure the state debt in GKO and OFZ.
The GKO and stock markets grew increasingly integrated with time to the
extent that the stock market became capable of generating natural constraints
on the efforts made by the Central Bank with the purpose of decreasing GKO
borrowing costs.
The authors have analyzed the contribution made by the presidential election of
1996 and the appearance of market-makers in the GKO market to the market
stabilization in 1997 and the decrease in the GKO borrowing costs and GKO
issue volatility in that period.
The GKO nonzero risk premium was estimated as the costs of position hedging
in the GKO futures market. The procedure used for estimating the risk
premiums may be useful for the governmental agencies as an instrument for
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estimating investors’ expectations and, hence, future spot prices of any
government debt obligations.
Analysis has been made of the relations between sector indices on the stock
market (Russian Trading System). Surprisingly, the structure of such relations
before the crisis of August 1998 was similar to that of stock market indices in
the industrial countries (USA, Great Britain). The only exception were the
energy and telecommunications sectors, probably owing to the backwardness
the Russian telecommunications industry in comparison to the American one
and to the intense market activity in the privatization of the «Sviazinvest»
company.
It was shown that before the crisis the activity in the over-the-counter currency
market determined the activity in the foreign currency exchanges.
The analysis of the GKO and currency forwards markets revealed that the
foreign investors favored portfolio investments in the period between 1996 and
1997. This finding suggests that the market was quite mature and fairly liberal
for foreign investors. The shares of the foreign investors in the GKO market
calculated from the daily trading data were practically identical to the figures
reported by the Central Bank thus demonstrating soundness of the methods
used in the analysis.
Introduction
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INTRODUCTION
In financial economics, it is often assumed that markets are integrated. For
example, to derive the Black-Scholes model it is assumed that the stock, bond
and options markets are perfectly integrated; that is, no cross-market arbitrage
opportunities exist.
In fact, even in the West, real markets are not perfectly integrated (Chen &
Knez, 1995; Kempf & Korn, 1996), and arbitrage opportunities are almost
certainly possible for Russian financial markets (Peresetsky & Roon, 1997).
The reason for this is that Russian financial markets are new emerging markets
and there is some trading friction in the market system itself, while different
agents operate in different segments of the financial markets, etc.
In this paper, the focus of our study is the GKO market, which played an
exceptional role due to its volume and its role for the government and investors
during the period 1995-1998 (up to the extreme measures freezing the GKO-
OFZ market on August 17, 1998). We study the stable period of development
of the GKO market during the period May 1996 - October 1997. We examine
the structure of the GKO market itself and its relationship with other segments
of the Russian financial market, such as the currency market, the interbank
loans market, the currency futures market, the GKO futures market, and the
stock market. We study the relationship of these markets with the world
financial market. Also, we compare the development of the emerging Russian
financial market with the financial markets of the industrial countries.
The study of the degree of integration in the Russian markets is of obvious
interest for Russian and foreign investors. Using this information, the investor
can choose the market in which to trade to optimize his risk, to use hedging
opportunities taking positions in different markets, etc.
A correlation of the daily returns and speed of convergence of the daily returns
are used as measures of the degree of integration of the two markets or the
two segments of the same market.
This paper is organized as follows. In the first chapter we briefly describe the
data that were used. The second chapter is devoted to an analysis of the
different segments of the Russian and world financial markets. In section 2.1,
we compare the over-the-counter and the exchange segments of the currency
market in Russia. We compare obtained results with the foreign currency
markets. We use the results of this section as a benchmark for the two closely
related markets later on.
In section 2.2, we consider the relationship between the over-the-counter
currency market and the one-day rouble interbank loans market. We show that
the relationship between the two markets (like the two markets in the previous
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chapter) became more close and less volatile during the period under
consideration. The measure of the degree of integration of the two markets is
lower than in the previous example, but still high.
In section 2.3, we study the relationship between the different segments of the
government bond market (short-, medium-, long-term GKOs, OFZ) during
1996-1997. We found two structural breaks in this period, the first connected
with the presidential elections in June 1996, and the second in October 1996,
connected with the introduction of the institution of market-makers to the GKO
market. Again, we find that the period October 96 -September 97 was a period
of market stabilization. GKO daily returns and its volatility both decreased over
this period.
In section 2.4, we study the integration between the GKO market and the
currency spot and forward markets. It is of interest because the share of
foreign investors in the GKO market was relatively high (18%-30%) during the
period October 1996 - September 1997. Again, we found a connection in our
model between jumps in volatility and events like the presidential election in
June 1996, extraordinary MF demand for borrowing on March 13 and 26 1996,
etc. The implicit estimate of the share of foreign investors based on the model
and market daily data shows strong agreement with the data announced by the
CB RF.
Section 2.5 is devoted to the GKO futures market. Volume in this market
decreased sharply in October 1997. We consider the question: is the futures
price an unbiased estimator of the future GKO spot price? The answer is
negative. Moreover, we found a structure of risk premia, which is highly time
variable. The risk premia is statistically different for MICEX and MCSE, which
could be explained by some institutional differences between the two
exchanges.
In section 2.6, we consider the relationship between the GKO and the stock
markets. We show that, in this period, the measure of integration between the
two markets increased over time, which could set up natural restrictions to the
CB and MF efforts in decreasing borrowing costs. In this section, we study the
sector or industry structure of the stock market itself. Surprisingly, we found
that the structure is similar to the structure of the industrial countries’ stock
markets, the exceptions being explained by particular events in the Russian
privatization process. Again, we found a stabilization of the relationship
between the two markets over time. The two final chapters offer a summary
and appendices.
I. Data
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DATA
In this chapter we describe the financial time series which we use in the paper.
1.1. GKO-OFZ.
All the available data on all GKO and OFZ issues are collected. (The complete
list of GKO issues, ordered by the dates of bond repayments, is included in
Appendix 1.) We also use RINACO Plus Government Bond Indexes such as:
GKO Index – this index reflects the performance of zero-coupon bills (GKOs).
The index was started on June 17, 1994.
OFZ Index – this index reflects the performance of Floating Coupon Bonds –
OFZs – and Fixed Coupon Bonds – OFZ-PDs. OFZs have been issued with 1
and 2 year maturities. The index was started on January 1, 1996.
Composite Bond Index – this index combines all the instruments included in
the GKO Index and the OFZ Index. The index was started on January 1, 1996.
GKO 7-30 Days to Maturity Index.
GKO 30-90 Days to Maturity Index.
GKO More than 90 Days to Maturity Index.
These 3 indexes combine zero-coupon bills with the particular number of days
to maturity. All 3 indexes were started on January 1, 1996.
1.2. Stock market
Today the Russian Trade System (RTS) is Russia’s principal market for equities
trading with a daily volume averaging US$50-100 million. We use:
a) The stock index calculated by the Russian Trade System. It is the NAUFOR
(National Association of Securities Market Participants) official index.
b) The RINACO Plus Equal Weighted Equity Index (RESI).
Both indices are based on data from RTS. The difference between them is that
the first is a capital-weighted index with weights, which reflect stock market
capitalization. The second one uses the same weights for all sets of the shares,
which are chosen in the calculation of the index. Both indices have their
advantages and disadvantages. The RTS index takes into consideration the
volume of the market (the size of the firms), but some peculiarities in the
trading of some shares (e.g. Gazprom) are ignored. The RESI is an attempt to
create a “strategy oriented” index designed to show the market’s performance
from the viewpoint of an active market participant. A detailed analysis of all the
available Russian stock market indices could be found in the paper by
A.Yashin.1 Perhaps we will need to construct our own stock market index, but
we need more detailed RTS data for that.
                                                  
1 A.Yashin. Analysis of the Russian stock market indices. Masters Thesis. NES, Moscow, 1997.
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1.3. Interbank loans
The interbank loans market (ICM) crashed in August 1995 and recovered its
structure and volumes only in spring 1996. This is why we consider data only
from May 1996 - October 1997. We use as the indicator the MIBOR one-day
loans basing rate. The rate is calculated by the Central Bank of RF, based on
the offer rates of the most large-scale Moscow banks. The two other rates,
MIACR and INSTAR, are calculated based on real contracts, but for different
reasons of both are considered not to be reliable. Note that one-day loans
form as much as 95-99% of the ICM.
1.4. Currency market (spot)
There exists two spot currency markets. The first is the Moscow Interbank
Currency Exchange (MICEX); the second is the off-floor market. Nowadays, the
volume of the over-the-counter market is significantly (in order of magnitude)
higher than the MICEX currency trading volumes. We use data on MICEX
currency trading since April 1991, when trading started, and the prices of over-
the-counter market contracts “today” and “tomorrow” from June 1996 -
October 1997.
1.5. Currency market (forward)
For forward contract data, we use data on the over-the-counter market for 1, 2
and 3 months to delivery forward contracts in US dollars. The day of delivery of
the contract is the 15th of each month. We have data on forward contracts for
December 1995 - October 1997. These data represent the average quotes of a
representative sample of Moscow banks, calculated by the financial analytical
information agency “Rosbusinessconsulting”.
1.6. Industrial countries’ financial markets
For the comparison of the indicators calculated for the Russian financial
market, we use the similar indicators calculated for the industrial countries’
financial markets. We use data on the US-UK, DM-UK, US-UK exchange rates,
indices for USA treasury bills with various periods to maturity, stock market
indices (DJCP65, S&P500, FTSE, FAZ, etc.) and industrial sector indices of
stock markets.
1.7. GKO futures market
We use all the available data from two Moscow exchanges (MICEX and MCSE)
on trading in GKO futures contracts on the secondary GKO market. These two
exchanges are the leaders in GKO futures trade.
Ii. Analysis of the inter-relationship between the one-day returns of the different
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II. ANALYSIS OF THE INTER-RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE ONE-DAY
RETURNS OF THE DIFFERENT SEGMENTS OF THE RUSSIAN FINANCIAL
MARKET.
2.1. The exchange and the over-the-counter segments
of the currency market.
It seems reasonable to start a study of the degree of integration between the
different segments of the Russian financial market with an analysis of the
degree of integration of the sectors of the same market (for example the
MICEX and the over-the-counter currency market, different GKO issues, etc.).
This approach allows us firstly to test different methods and models of market
integration, and secondly to get a value of market integration which could be,
in the farther analysis, a benchmark for strong market integration.
On this basis, we choose as the first example the two sectors of the currency
market (MICEX and the over-the-counter market). We use daily observations
for the period May 1996 - October 1997 (a total of 336 observations). The
starting point of this period was chosen as May 1996, because at this point the
model of establishing the official exchange rate was changed by the CB RF.
This gave an impetus to increasing volumes and activity in the over-the-counter
sector of the currency market.
Let us take the following notation:
RMICEX(t) = MICEX(t)/MICEX(t-1)-1;    RMB(t) = MB(t)/MB(t-1)-1 – the daily
returns of the MICEX and the over-the-counter currency markets respectively.
XT(t) = RMB(t)-RMICEX(t) – the spread between daily returns.
A correlation matrix was calculated (Table 1):
Table 1. Correlations of the daily returns of the MICEX, the over-the
counter market and their spread.
RMB RMICEX XT
RMB 1 0.59 0.51
RMICEX 0.59 1 -0.40
XT 0.51 -0.40 1
The correlation coefficient between the daily returns (the first measure of
market integration) is equal to 0.59.
Consider the model of convergence of the returns:
XT(t)-XT(t-1) = -m*XT(t-1) + u(t) (1)
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Parameter m (“discrepancy”) in this model is in fact a speed of convergence,
and so could be considered as a second measure of the degree of market
integration.
The results of the GARCH(1,1) estimation are as follows:
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.
XT(-1) 1.361672 0.096565 14.10106 0.0000
The estimation of the model shows that the “discrepancy” measure could be
applied to the problem under consideration. The obtained value of 1.36 could
be used as a benchmark for highly integrated markets.
Now let us modify the model, inserting two more lags.
XT(t)-XT(t-1)  =  b1*XT(t-1) + b2*XT(t-2) + b3*XT(t-3) + u(t) (2)
The results of the estimation of this model with EGARCH(1,1) model for errors
are:
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.
XT(-1) -1.473617 0.066508 -22.15714 0.0000
XT(-2) -0.353111 0.060866 -5.801469 0.0000
XT(-3) -0.215915 0.060953 -3.542297 0.0005
Variance Equation
C -0.647261 0.413841 -1.564036 0.1188
|RES|/SQR[GARCH](1) 0.259789 0.078255 3.319798 0.0010
RES/SQR[GARCH](1) 0.027578 0.085174 0.323787 0.7463
EGARCH(1) 0.968684 0.025882 37.42707 0.0000
R-squared 0.697790 Mean dependent var 2.95E-06
Adjusted R-squared 0.692228 S.D. dependent var 0.001767
S.E. of regression 0.000981 Akaike info criterion -13.83409
Sum squared resid 0.000313 Schwarz criterion -13.75404
Log likelihood 1910.904 F-statistic 125.4532
Durbin-Watson stat 1.987823 Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000
We can see that the estimated value of m (1.47) is now even more significantly
different from zero. Model (2) is supported by empirical observations on the
character of the inter-relationship between the MICEX and the over-the-
counter markets (the descriptive model of damped out fluctuations).
An examination of the volatility of the spread between the daily returns of the
currency MICEX and the over-the-counter markets cleared the short periods of
spasmodic growth in this variable. This is a signal for a break in the traditional
mechanics of interdependence between these segments of the market. The
graph of the conditional standard deviation is presented in Figure 1.
Ii. Analysis of the inter-relationship between the one-day returns of the different
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Figure 1.
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An analysis of market history makes it possible to connect increased volatility
with the periods of destabilization of all segments of the Russian financial
market. In doing so, the cause and the mechanics of the development of
destabilization could be quite different. For example, the periods 9 January
1997 and 28-29 October 1997 were characterized by a sharp growth of
autonomous demand for currency (i.e. unconnected with the flow of money
into the other segments of the Russian financial market). On the other hand,
during the periods 21 August 1996 and 11-24 March 1997, a changing of GKO
market returns was observed. The particular path of development of the shock
impulses between the two currency markets requires separate study in each
case.
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With the Granger causality test, we came to the conclusion that the over-the-
counter currency market leads the MICEX market, not the reverse.
Null Hypothesis: Obs F-Statistic Probability
RMICEX does not Granger Cause RMB 335 0.64261 0.42334
RMB does not Granger Cause RMICEX 23.1989 2.2E-06
This conclusion is quite in accordance with the observations. There are two
main reasons for this:
- The volumes of daily trading on the over-the-counter market are significantly
higher than the daily volumes of the MICEX currency market. During the period
under consideration, the average daily volume of trading only for the Moscow
banks was approximately as much as $800-$1,000 millions, whereas the gross
MICEX daily volume was below $50-$100 millions.
- The transactional (commission) costs and time (lags, forward charges) costs
of the currency exchange are significantly lower on the over-the-counter
market.
2.1.1. Comparison with industrial countries’ currency markets
Let us consider the rouble exchange rates RBEX (MICEX), RBMB (over-the-
counter market), DM (German mark), BP (British pound) and DMC (cross-rate
US/BP/DM). All rates are presented as the price of the unit of national
currency in US dollars.
The correlations between the one-day returns of investment into these
currencies are presented in Table 2. Correlation coefficients are calculated for
the period July 96 - October 97.
Table 2.
RBEX RBMB RBP RDM RDMC
RBEX 1.0000 0.9997 0.0131 0.0152 0.0162
RBMB 0.9997 1.0000 0.0118 0.0155 0.0164
RBP 0.0131 0.0118 1.0000 0.1545 0.3479
RDM 0.0152 0.0155 0.1545 1.0000 0.7772
RDMC 0.0162 0.0164 0.3479 0.7772 1.0000
The correlations between the daily returns for the two rouble rates and for the
two DM rates (exchange rate and cross-rate DMC) are rather high and are
both significantly greater than the correlation between the daily investment
returns in DM and BP, which is very small (0.15). All other correlation
coefficients do not differ significantly from zero. The low value of the
Ii. Analysis of the inter-relationship between the one-day returns of the different
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correlation between the daily investment returns in DM and BP could be
explained by the different macro-economic factors, which affect exchange
rates. These factors are specific to each of the countries.
Consider the relationship between the DM/US exchange rate and the
DM/BP/US cross-rate. Obviously, they should be strongly integrated (the
correlation is 0.78, see Table 2) and the parameter m, which characterizes the
speed of convergence of the daily returns, should be high. The result of the
model (1) estimations for the convergence process of the two “direct” and
“cross” rates DM and DMC is reported below.
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.
C 1.67E-05 0.000337 -0.049466 0.9606
XDMDMC(-1) -1.518135 0.097396 -15.58717 0.0000
Variance Equation
C 2.17E-06 7.42E-06 0.292870 0.7698
ARCH(1) 0.149999 0.150496 0.996698 0.3196
GARCH(1) 0.599997 0.363819 1.649161 0.1001
R-squared 0.758039 Mean dependent var -1.77E-05
Adjusted R-squared 0.755098 S.D. dependent var 0.006528
S.E. of regression 0.003230 Akaike info criterion -11.45540
Log likelihood 1449.254 F-statistic 257.6812
Durbin-Watson stat 2.319702 Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000
The obtained value m = 1.52 is approximately equal to the values 1.36 – 1.47,
which we have obtained for the pair RBEX and RBMB above. In both cases, we
have an example of closely related markets.
Figure 2 presents the graph of the conditional standard deviation. There are
three peaks on the plot.
Two of all – 04.12.96 and 23.05.97 – could be related to the periods of the
joint intervention of the central banks of a number of industrialized countries in
order to break the unfavorable movement of the Japanese yen against the US
dollar. This led to fluctuations in the relationship between other currencies. The
third peak is connected with the “Asian” crisis of autumn 1997.
Note the interesting fact that the graph of the conditional standard deviation of
the GARCH(1,1) estimation for model (1) for the pair DM-DMC during the wider
period 16.04.91 – 6.11.97 (see Figure 3), and the plot of leverage measure
(Greene, p.288) (see Figure 4), point out the same periods as special.
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Figure 2.
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 Plot of the Leverage Measures of the Regression
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The Granger causality test for the exchange rates under consideration gives
the following results for the period July 1996 - October 1997.
Pairwise Granger Causality Tests
Lags: 5
Null Hypothesis Obs F-Statistic Probability
RBMB does not Granger Cause RBEX 332 16.8094 9.3E-15**
RBEX does not Granger Cause RBMB 2.35176 0.04066
RBP does not Granger Cause RBEX 334 0.72601 0.60434
RBEX does not Granger Cause RBP 0.33470 0.89180
RDM does not Granger Cause RBEX 334 0.78884 0.55831
RBEX does not Granger Cause RDM 0.17596 0. 97146
RBP does not Granger Cause RBMB 332 0.31628 0.90307
RBMB does not Granger Cause RBP 0.59515 0.70371
RDM does not Granger Cause RBMB 332 0.72526 0.60490
RBMB does not Granger Cause RDM 0.15806 0.97748
RDM does not Granger Cause RBP 334 6.09289 2.1E-05**
RBP does not Granger Cause RDM 0.38502 0.85898
RDM does not Granger Cause RBP 1261 3.77881 0.02311**
RBP does not Granger Cause RDM 1.60069 0.20217
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From the results, one can see that the null hypothesis, that the over-the-
counter rouble exchange rate does not statistically ‘cause’ the MICEX
exchange rate, is rejected with a high confidence level. The hypothesis that the
DM does not ‘cause’ British pound is rejected as well. The rouble exchange
rate is irrelevant to both the sterling and the DM exchange rates.
The conclusion that the rouble exchange rate is not related to the DM or the
sterling exchange rates could be supported by the GARCH(1,1) estimation of
model (1). For the pair DM-RBEX we have m =1.017 (0.05) and for the pair BP-
RBEX we have m = 0.999 (0.06), i.e. in both cases m does not significantly
differ in statistical terms from 1. (The estimation results are reported in
Appendix 3.)
Figure 5.
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Estimating the “discrepancy” measure m for the daily returns of investments in
sterling and the DM during the period April 1991 - October 1997, we have (see
Appendix 3) m = 1.25 (0.015), i.e. m differs statistically significantly from 1, so
we have a process of convergence in the returns. Value 1.25 is less than the
values obtained above for closely related markets of 1.36-1.47 (MICEX - over-
the-counter rouble/dollar markets), 1.52 for the DM/USD and the artificial
DM/USD courses.
For the short period of observations, the result is on the border of statistical
significance: m = 1.11 (.005). Volatility increased during this period (see Figure
5). The peak in volatility was observed on August 14, 1997. At this point, a
break in the dynamics of the sterling/DM exchange rate was observed. After a
Ii. Analysis of the inter-relationship between the one-day returns of the different
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long period of growth, the course of the DM against the British pound turned
downwards.
Figure 6. Rolling regression with window size = 100 obs. SGM100
regression standard error, MU100 coefficient m. Data presented are
95% confidence intervals for m.
M I C E X - M B  R o l l i n g  r e g r e s s i o n  c o e f f i c i e n t  a n d  s t a n d a r d  d e v i a t i o n  o f  r e g r e s s i o n
-2.00
-1.50
-1.00
-0.50
0.00
15
-1
1-
96
15
-1
2-
96
14
-0
1-
97
14
-0
2-
97
16
-0
3-
97
16
-0
4-
97
16
-0
5-
97
16
-0
6-
97
16
-0
7-
97
15
-0
8-
97
15
-0
9-
97
15
-1
0-
97
15
-1
1-
97
-0.0010
-0.0005
0.0000
0.0005
0.0010
0.0015
MU100
mu_lb
mu_up
S G M 1 0 0
Note (see Figure 1) that volatility for the pair of Russian currency markets
RBEX-RBMR decreased during this period.
Let us consider the dynamics of the discrepancy measure m for the pair
RBMB-RBEX over this period, calculated on the basis of rolling regression with
a window size of 100 observations. Figure 6 presents a plot of the coefficient m
the 95% confidence limits for m and the standard error of the regression. One
can observe the decline of the standard deviation over the period November
1996 - October 1997, implying that the currency market became more stable.
The coefficient m is statistically significantly different from 1 over almost the
whole period.
Analogous plots for the pair DM-DMC are presented in Figure 7. m fluctuates
around 1.5 and differs significantly from 1 over the whole period. The standard
deviation is at a maximum in summer 1995. This would correspond to the
beginning of the three-year period of growth in the dollar against most world
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currencies, leading to a change in the dynamic relationships of other
currencies.
Figure 7. Rolling regression with window size = 100 obs. SGDMDMC
regression standard error, MUDMDMC coefficient m. Data presented
are 95% confidence intervals for m.
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2.2. The over-the-counter currency market and the
one-day rouble interbank loans market
Now let us consider the degree of integration of two markets which are not as
closely related as the exchange and the over-the counter exchange currency
markets, which we discussed in section 2.1 above.
The first is the Moscow market of the one-day rouble interbank loans. As much
as 95-99% of the volume of this market is the volume of one-day loans, so we
chose for this study the annualized rates of one-day loans, calculated by the
formula accepted on this market: R=r*365. Here r  is the one-day loan rate
and R  is the annualized one-day loan rate.
The second market is the over-the-counter currency market. It is well known
that the lion’s share of this market consists of bargains with payment “today”
and payment “tomorrow”. It is easy to see that the combination of these two
contracts is in fact equivalent to the attraction (or allocation) of the one-day
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loan. Here could lie arbitrage opportunities, and it the reason to suppose that
these markets could be closely related.
In fact, let us at the same time consider the difference between the two
exchange rates “today” (TOD) and “tomorrow” (TOM), calculated from daily
returns. Where MBTT = (TOM/TOD-1)*100 is greater than the current one-day
loans rate, the market participant could gain profits if, with borrowed money,
he buys the currency with a “today” contract and sells it at the same time on a
“tomorrow” contract. In the reverse situation, where MBTT is smaller than the
current one-day loans rate, it is reasonable to sell the currency on a “today”
contract, simultaneously buy it with a “tomorrow” contract and allocate the
profit proceeds for one day on the one-day loans market. Again, one could
gain a profit from doing so.
The institutional features of these markets - the make-up of the participants
(the big banks, which have mutual limits on dealing operations), the special
features of the trading system (mutual channels for dealing operations) – could
lead to the hypothesis that there exists a close inter-relationship between the
two markets. It is known – at least from the market traders – that there exists
particular speculative activity (especially so for Moscow banks), based on the
various combinations of the over-the counter market contracts and short term
rouble/dollar loans, which is called “rouble/dollar dealing”. We failed to find in
the literature any statistics on operations of this kind but, in the banks’
estimation, the daily volume of these operations in Moscow alone was nearly
$800-$1,000 millions in the middle of 1997.
Let us compare the behavior of the “daily returns”, i.e. the rates of the one-day
loans (MIBOR) and its imitations on the over-the-counter market (MBTT).
Table 3 presents descriptive statistics of these two markets during the period
21 June 1996 - 6 November 1997 (using annualized rates).
Table 3.
MIBOR MBTT MIBOR-MBTT
min 8.20 -7.70 -33.77
max 70.00 82.21 55.76
average 24.79 15.31 9.58
std.dev. 10.59 15.39 10.82
From Table 3, one can see that the interbank loans market is preferable for
investors for two reasons: it has both higher rates and lower variance.
This paradox could be explained by the fact that the banks are required to
provide reserves for invested roubles. The existence of these obligatory
reservations means that the real loans rate, which banks use for estimating
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their opportunity for arbitrage operation, is significantly lower than the
announced one-day loans rate.
During the period under consideration, the rates for obligatory reservations for
the commercial banks for short-term invested resources (up to 30 days)
changed as follows:
June - July 1996 20%
August - October 1996 18%
November 1996 - April 1997 16%
May - October 1997 14%
Taking into account these figures, we can explain no more than 20% of the
systematic shift upwards of the MIBOR from the MBTT. At the same time, we
can see that, from the figures in Table 2, the systematic shift is nearly 40% of
the MIBOR.
The second factor, which leads to the shift, is the particular nature of the data
on that one-day loan rates. The issue is that the MIBOR rate is calculated by
the CB RF as an average of the announced offer rates of the largest banks, but
the rates of the real bargains are significantly lower. The data on real bargains
are not available. The two indexes calculated from the real bargains, MIACR
and INSTAR, are not sufficiently representative in the estimation of the
bankers. As a first approximation, we can accept that the unexplained part of
the systematic shift between MIBOR and MBTT could be explained by the
spread between the announced and the actual one-day loan rates.
The Granger test for causality rejects both hypotheses of the causal
dependence between the two markets, so neither of the two markets ‘leads’
the other one:
Pairwise Granger Causality TestsLags: 2
Null Hypothesis: Obs F-Statistic Probability
MBTT does not Granger Cause MIBOR 329 9.94685 6.4E-05
MIBOR does not Granger Cause MBTT 5.08649 0.00668
Turning to the rate of return convergence, which could be defined as the
parameter m in model:
DX(t) = const -mX(t-1) + ut , (3)
where  DX(t)= X(t) - X(t-1),    X(t)= MIBORt - MBTTt.
Estimating equation (3) for the period 21.06.96 – 6.11.97, we obtain:
D(MIBOR- MBTT)t = 8.3 - 0.88*(MIBOR- MBTT)t-1 + et
corresponding t-statistics are equal to 8.2 and 10.5.
Ii. Analysis of the inter-relationship between the one-day returns of the different
segments of the russian financial market
23
LS // Dependent Variable is XT-XT(-1)
White Heteroscedasticity-Consistent Standard Errors & Covariance
Variable Coefficient Std.Error t-Statistic Prob.
C 8.314329 1.012921 8.208268 0.0000
XT(-1) -0.876086 0.083299 -10.51732 0.0000
R-squared
0.442080 Mean dependent var -0.051887
Adjusted R-squared 0.440390 S.D. dependent var 14.26277
S.E. of regression 10.66956 Akaike info criterion 4.740796
Sum squared resid 37567.05 Schwarz criterion 4.763718
Log likelihood -1256.060 F-statistic 261.4830
Durbin-Watson stat 2.043561 Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000
More rigorous from an econometric point of view, a comparison of equation (3)
with the GARCH(1,1) model for errors gives almost the same results (the
results are presented in Appendix 4). We met the same situation concerning
estimated equation (1) for comparing the two currency markets in section 2.1
above.
Note that coefficient m , which is a measure of market integration, is equal to
0.88, which is lower than the value 1.36 that we obtained for the two currency
market segments. This is in accordance with our intuition that these two
markets are less integrated than the two segments of the currency market.
The graph of conditional standard deviations for model (3) with the
GARCH(1,1) model for errors ut  is presented in the figure in Appendix 5. The
graph shows a tendency to decreasing volatility during the period under
consideration. This means that the market became more stable and more
mature.
2.3. Different segments of the government bond market (GKO, OFZ)
2.3.1. The evolution of the main features of the GKO-OFZ market
in 1996-1997
In this section we consider the GKO-OFZ market as an ensemble of the
different segments of the government bond market with different times to
maturity (short-, medium-, long-term GKOs, OFZ). We use the results of the
previous chapters as a benchmark for the measure of integration of the
markets. We look for structural breaks during this period, which could be
connected with the presidential elections in June 1996 and in October 1996, or
connected with the introduction of the institution of market-makers on the GKO
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market in October 1996. We study the tendency of the market over the period
October 1996-September 1997.
First we consider the main changes in the parameters of the GKO-OFZ market
which could be found from the statistics.
In the graph in Figure 8, each GKO issue (t-bill) is represented by two points:
its volatility (the standard deviation of the GKO daily returns) and its average
return, both calculated over the lifetime of the issue. Both values are inferred
from the date on the x-axis, which is the maturity date of the bill. Each of the
GKOs from the list (Appendix 4) is presented on the graph.
Figure 8.
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On the graph, one can observe an obvious principal change of the parameters
of the market, starting with the bonds maturing in January 1997. This
corresponds approximately to the period of trading since July 1996, i.e. the
period after the presidential election. From this point, one can observe a sharp
decrease in the daily returns and their standard deviations. This decrease in
volatility is related to the structural break in the GKO market, which took place
in the second half of 1996. One of the crucial points in this break was the
introduction in October 1996 of the institution of market-makers. Market-
makers are 40 the most significant participants in the market with special rights
and special obligations to support two-sided quotes with a fixed (prescribed)
spread on the key bonds. This, together with the significant difficulties
introduced for small, mostly speculative investors, lead to a significant stability
in the market and the reduced volatility of the GKO daily returns.
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Figure 9.  (Presidential elections - June 1996)
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Figure 10. (The introduction of the institution of market-makers -
October 1996)
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Closer examination of the behavior of average daily returns and the standard
deviations of the returns was done at an important time for the GKO market,
namely the presidential elections in June 1996 and the structural changes in
the market in October 1996. Figure 9 presents averaged returns and the
standard deviation of returns for each of the two six-week intervals (15 April -
31 May 1996 and 15 July - 30 August 1996) for each GKO issue traded during
the period. The x axis indicates the maturity days. The elections took place in a
six-week period between the two intervals. In Figure 10, the same idea is
applied for the two time intervals (15 August - 30 September 1996 and 1
November - 15 December 1996) around the structural break in the market in
October 1996.
In Figures 9 and 10, one can see that both events had an impact in decreasing
the volatility of the daily returns. At the same time, the average values of the
returns did not change significantly. The dependence of the standard deviation
on the time to maturity also incidentally decreased. This could be interpreted
that, after each event, the future became more predictable (the uncertainty of
the future decreased). Summarizing all this, we came to the conclusion that the
impact of the presidential elections in June 1996 and the market reforms of
October 1996 caused increased stability of GKO quotes and a decreasing of
the speculative part of the market.
2.3.2.RINACO’s GKO and OFZ indexes
Let us consider now the degree of integration between segments of the
government bonds market.
In Table 4, descriptive statistics of the daily returns of the GKO-OFZ market are
presented. We use here indexes constructed by RINACO. (OFZ - index of the
OFZ bonds; RTBI - general GKO index; GKO7, GKO30 and GKO90 - GKO
indexes for bills with periods to maturity of 7-30, 30-90, and more than 90 days
respectively). The data are presented for the whole period 10.01.96 - 17.10.97,
and for the two sub-periods 10.01.96 - 17.11.96 and 17.11.96 - 17.10.97.
The first sub-period includes the presidential elections. At the end of this
period, some significant changes were made to the trading rules. At the end of
August 1996, the CB RF changed the rules for foreign participants in the
government bond market. Namely: 1) for the first time, non-residents were
admitted to the secondary trading market; and 2) the procedure of investment
in the GKO market was simplified for foreign investors (the number of banks
which foreign investors could use increased from 3 to 33, the procedure of
repatriation of profits from currency forward contracts was standardized, etc.)
In October 1996, the institution of market-makers was introduced to the GKO
market for the purpose of making the market more stable and predictable. The
market-maker must support during each trading session ‘put’ and ‘call’ claims
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with prescribed volumes on each of the key GKO issues. The spread between
‘put’ and ‘call’ prices should be less than the prescribed threshold. In return,
the market-maker obtains access to REPO operations and to lombard credits
of the CB, etc.
Table 4.
10 Jan 1996  -- 17 Oct 1997
RTBI OFZ GKO7 GKO30 GKO90
min -3.00% -11.15% -1.45% -2.50% -4.60%
max 5.99% 11.45% 1.57% 4.03% 10.04%
average 0.19% 0.16% 0.11% 0.18% 0.22%
st. dev 0.70% 1.68% 0.27% 0.54% 1.17%
10 Jan 1996  -- 17 Nov 1996
RTBI OFZ GKO7 GKO30 GKO90
min -3.00% -11.15% -1.45% -2.50% -4.60%
max 5.99% 11.45% 1.57% 4.03% 10.04%
average 0.20% 0.18% 0.11% 0.18% 0.24%
st. dev 0.70% 1.55% 0.27% 0.55% 1.18%
18 Nov 1996  -- 17 Oct 1997
RTBI OFZ GKO7 GKO30 GKO90
min -1.27% -3.35% -0.21% -0.87% -1.72%
max 0.72% 3.89% 0.68% 0.74% 1.02%
average 0.10% 0.10% 0.07% 0.08% 0.13%
st. dev 0.23% 0.49% 0.10% 0.18% 0.31%
From Table 4, one can see that the second period was a more stable one. The
standard deviation of the daily returns decreased by 3-4 times. A significant
decrease in the domestic borrowing costs of the Ministry of Finance of the RF
could also be observed. The mean daily return decreased by 2.7 times for
short maturity bills and by 3.2 - 3.8 times for long maturity bills.
The matrix of the correlation coefficients of the daily returns is presented in
Table 5 (for all three periods mentioned above). In the table, we can find that
the correlation coefficients are a bit lower than the correlation coefficients
presented in Table 3 of our grant proposal to the EERC (Table 3 from the
proposal is reproduced in Appendix 8). However, in the proposal we calculated
not daily but weekly returns, which contain relatively less level of noise.
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Table 5.
10 Jan 1996  -- 17 Oct 1997
RTBI OFZ GKO7 GKO30 GKO90
RTBI 1 0.75 0.63 0.92 0.97
OFZ 0.75 1 0.46 0.68 0.76
GKO7 0.63 0.46 1 0.77 0.48
GKO30 0.92 0.68 0.77 1 0.83
GKO90 0.97 0.76 0.48 0.83 1
10 Jan 1996  -- 17 Nov 1996
RTBI OFZ GKO7 GKO30 GKO90
RTBI 1 0.77 0.63 0.92 0.97
OFZ 0.77 1 0.47 0.70 0.77
GKO7 0.63 0.47 1 0.76 0.48
GKO30 0.92 0.70 0.76 1 0.83
GKO90 0.97 0.77 0.48 0.83 1
18 Nov  1996  -- 17 Oct 1997
RTBI OFZ GKO7 GKO30 GKO90
RTBI 1 0.38 0.54 0.87 0.97
OFZ 0.38 1 0.17 0.32 0.39
GKO7 0.54 0.17 1 0.74 0.45
GKO30 0.87 0.32 0.74 1 0.81
GKO90 0.97 0.39 0.45 0.81 1
From Table 5, one can derive that the correlation coefficients for the second
period do not differ from the coefficients for the first, excluding, perhaps, the
OFZ. Correlation of the daily returns of the OFZ with the GKO decreased by 2
times. As a first approach, one explanation could be the structural changes in
the market and the structure of the participants; namely, the market-makers
were obliged by the CB RF to support the GKOs but not the OFZ bonds. The
increased influence of foreign investors on the market also did not touch OFZs
with floating coupons, because of the additional risk connected with the future
uncertainty of the coupon rates.
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The daily returns of GKOs with short maturities (less than one month) are
highly correlated with the mid-maturities GKOs (from 1 to 3 months) - 0.74;
less correlated with long-term GKOs (greater than 3 months) - 0.45; and
significantly less correlated with OFZs - 0.17. This situation could be explained
by the essentially different investment properties of the short-, mid-, and long-
term maturities of GKOs and OFZs. Investment into GKOs with short maturities
serves (for banks) as a rule for the effective regulation of a rouble liquidity, or
for a short-term speculative arbitrage-type bargains during one trading
session. GKOs and OFZs with long maturities serve as instruments for long
investments. Mid-maturity bonds are somewhere in between.
Table 6 presents the results of the model (4) estimation:
DX(t) =const -mX(t-1) + ut (4)
Xt  = difference between the daily returns of the two indexes. Parameter m (m >
0) is a measure of market integration. The estimated value m, its t-statistics t(m
), and R2 and DW statistics are also presented for each model. In each cell of
Table 6, three estimates are presented for three periods of observations:  1) 10
January 1996 - 17 October 1997;  2) 10 January 1996 - 17 November 96;  3)
18 November 1996 - 17 October 1997.
In all the estimates, we used the GARCH(1,1) model for disturbances ut.
Graphs of the conditional standard deviation of the disturbances are presented
in Table 6 for the whole period. All the graphs have peaks related to the
presidential election of 19 June 1996 and to the sharp destabilization of the
GKO market caused by the extraordinary borrowing needs of the MF RF on 26
March 1996. Most of the estimated values of the coefficient valuem fluctuate in
the range 0.7-0.8, which is less than the value obtained for the two closely-
integrated currency markets (1.36). In order of magnitude, it more or less
corresponds to the value of 0.88 obtained for the paired interbank loans
market - over-the-counter currency market. The biggest value, close to 1.0, is
obtained for comparing the long GKO and OFZ, but in that case the quality of
the model’s predictions is not reliable.
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2.4. The inter-relationship between the currency markets (spot and
forward) and the GKO market
In this section, we study the degree of integration between the two different
sectors of the Russian financial market; that is, the GKO market and the
forward currency market. It is interesting to study the degree of integration of
these two markets because the share of foreign investors in the GKO market
was relatively high (18%-30%) during the period October 1996 - September
1997. Besides foreign investors, some Russian investors who are interested in
currency profits from operations with GKOs take positions in both markets.
In August 1996, the CB RF introduced a new scheme of trading for foreign
investors in the rouble government bonds market. This scheme suggested that
foreign investors hedge their rouble profits from the government bonds market
in the forward currency market. This fact, and the volume of operations of such
a kind (as much as 3.6 billions in Quarter IV of 1996 and 8.4 in Quarter I of
1997, from the official data), give us a basis for setting up the hypothesis that
the integration between the two markets - the GKO (mostly the GKO with long
maturities exceeding 3 months) and the forward currency market – should
have increased since October-November 1996, when the new scheme for non-
residents started to work in full.
The supposed logic could read as follows. The autonomous increase in the
forward quotes means – if we suppose that the spot-course has been constant
– a decrease in the currency profits of the rouble investments of foreign
investors in the GKO market. In this case, the demand for rouble government
bonds from foreigners should decrease. Taking into account the significant role
of foreign investors in the GKO market (by the official estimation of the CB RF,
the share of foreign investors in total GKO market capitalization was 30% at the
end of 1996, but 18% in the middle of 1997), means that the quotes of the
GKO should show slow growth or even a decrease. The same reasons are true
for the decrease in the forward rates. If the hypothesis is valid, we should
observe that, in both cases, the two markets (long GKOs and currency
forwards) move always in opposite directions.
The model could be made more plausible by including in it the currency spot
rate. In fact, not only the current forward rate but the combination of the
current spot rate, the current forward rate and the GKO rouble rate give impact
to the decisions of foreign investors. The ratio of the forward rate and the spot
course is important in the calculation of the currency profits of investment in
the GKO for foreign investors.
In the first stage, we attempted to test the hypothesis by comparing the single
forward contract with particular GKO issues.
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2.4.1. The single forward contract and particular GKO issues
Let us consider the question about the tactics of the foreign investor in the
GKO market. According to the scheme suggested by the CB RF in August 1996
(type “C” accounts), simultaneously with the currency conversion for the
purchase of GKOs, investors have to go into long forward contracts. One of the
tactics of the foreign investor could be as follows: buying bills of one GKO
issue and simultaneously going into long forward contracts with approximately
the same maturity as the GKO issue.
To test this, we chose as an example forward contracts with a day of delivery
of 15.08.97 (F150897). Now consider the correlation of its daily “returns” with
the daily returns of the GKO with close maturity dates (23.07.97, 30.07.97,
6.08.97, 13.08.97, 20.08.97, 27.08.97, 30.08.97, 3.09.97, 10.09.97, 17.09.97)
(G230797, ...), and also with the dollar spot rate on the MICEX (MICEX), the
dollar spot rate on the over-the-counter market (MB), the RINACO GKO index
(RTBI), and the spreads between the daily returns of the forward and currency
markets (F-MICEX, F-MB). The correlation coefficients calculated for the period
5 May 1997 - 31 July 1997 are presented in Table 7.
From Table 7, we can see that:
1) The correlation between the forward contract itself with the GKO is very
small. Better correlated with the GKO is the spread between the forward and
spot courses. The correlation is negative, as expected.
2) There is no significant difference in the correlation between the different
GKO issues or between the GKO index and F-MB. This means that foreign
investors invest not in the particular GKO issue, but in GKO market portfolios.
Behavior of this type is usual for professional investors of an active type.
Undoubtedly, most foreign investors who work the GKO market are of this type.
On the other point of view, this could be an indirect indication of a certain
degree of maturity of the GKO market itself and of the rules for foreign
participants.
From the same Table 7, one can see that the correlation between particular
GKO issues is rather high (0.72 - 0.94) and is close to the correlation between
the two segments of the currency market (0.92).
2.4.2. The currency (spot, forward) market and the GKO indexes
The testing of the hypothesis arising from model (5) for the relationship
between the currency forwards and GKO markets with the GARCH model for
errors during the period January 1996 - October 1997 (416 observations)
found a statistically significant measure of integration (m = 0.33; see below).
Note that this value is approximately 4 times smaller than our benchmark of
1.36 for the strong integration between the two currency markets.
Ii. Analysis of the inter-relationship between the one-day returns of the different
segments of the russian financial market
33
The Development of the State Bond Market
34
Let us denote as FW3 and GKO90 respectively the daily “returns” of 3-month
forward contracts and the daily return of the RINACO GKO index for bills with a
period to maturity greater than 3 months.
Consider the model
GKO90 = c1 + c2*FWD3 + c3*AR(1) + u  (5)
The results of the model (5) estimation using the GARCH(1,1) model for errors
are:
ARCH // Dependent Variable is GKO90
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.
C 0.000937 0.000144 6.500648 0.0000
FWD3 -0.328070 0.116303 -2.820825 0.0050
AR(1) 0.303967  0.045330 6.705709 0.0000
Variance Equation
C 1.95E-08 6.71E-08 0.290018 0.7719
ARCH(1) 0.319809 0.051961 6.154776 0.0000
GARCH(1) 0.774864 0.026691 29.03086 0.0000
R-squared 0.136430 Mean dependent var 0.002403
Adjusted R-squared 0.125899S D. dependent va r 0.011811
S.E. of regression 0.011042 Akaike info criterion -8.997742
Sum squared resid 0.049991 Schwarz criterion -8.939607
Log likelihood 1575.494 F-statistic 12.95467
Durbin-Watson stat 1.824157 Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000
As we discussed above, a more adequate model would include not only the
forward rate, but also the spot rate as well. So we have built into model (5) a
spread of the forward and spot daily returns instead of the forward returns. We
use the MICEX market here for the currency spot rate.
GKO90 = c1+c2*(FWD3 - MICEX)+c3*AR(1)+u, (6)
The results of the model (6) estimation using the GARCH(1,1) model for errors
are:
ARCH // Dependent Variable is GKO90
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.
C 0. 000804 0.000148 5.421851 0.0000
(FWD3-MICEX)- 0.502855 0.095501 5.265448 0.0000
AR(1) 0.295172 0.044181 6.680920 0.0000
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Variance Equation
C 2.67E-08 6.24E-08 0.428255 0.6687
ARCH(1) 0.343638 0.053136 6.467188 0.0000
GARCH(1)  0.758652 0.026443 28.69001 0.0000
R-squared 0.13869 Mean dependent var 0.002403
Adjusted R-squared 0.1281871 S.D. dependent va r 0.011811
S.E. of regression 0.011028 Akaike info criterion 9.000364
Sum squared resid 0.049861 Schwarz criterion -8.942229
Log likelihood 1582.561 F-statistic 13.20392
Durbin-Watson stat 1.800805 Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000
Model (6) is better than model (5). Even so, we found m = 0.50, which is still
2.7 times smaller than the benchmark value of 1.36.
In Figure 11, we plot the conditional standard deviation of model (6).
Figure 11
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Conditional SD graph for equation:
rGKO90 = c1+c2*(rFw-rSpot)
The upsurge in volatility again corresponds to the periods of destabilization in
the GKO market:
13, 26 March 1996 – the sharp increase in MF borrowing costs caused by the
extraordinary demand for borrowing from MF RF.
20 May –18 June – related to the presidential elections.
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30 September 1996  the increasing correction of GKO interest rates after its
decline following the positive outcome of the presidential elections.
Consider a model, which includes two types of investors in the GKO ma rket.
Investors of the first type (foreign investors and some Russian investors who
are interested in currency profits from operations with GKOs) use cu rrency
forwards to hedge their positions in the GKO market. Their decision to invest in
the GKO depends on the value dGt + (dFt - dSt). (Here dGt , dFt   and dSt
denote the daily investment returns in the GKO, currency forwards and the US
dollar respectively). Investors of the second type do not use currency forwards
and their decision depends on the value dGt  - dSt. For a mixture of the two
types of investors with weights a, b  we have:
dGt » - a× (dFt - dSt) + b×(dSt).
Taking into account that the RINACO indices are denominated in dollars, we
obtain:
d 
~Gt  » - a(dFt - dSt) + b(dSt) - dSt = -a dFt + dSt(a+b-1)
The GARCH(1,1) estimation of the regression
GKO90 = b0 + b1 FWD3 + b2 MICEX + b3 AR(1) + e,
for the two periods January 1996 - January 1997 and February 1997 - October
1997 is presented in Table 8.
Table 8.
January 1996 - January 1997 February 1997 - October 1997
Variable Coeff t-Stat. Coeff t-Stat.
const 0.00159 2.25 0.0010 20.9
FWD3 -0.929 -4.99 -0.380 -7.74
MICEX 1.58 2.72 0.259 5.73
AR(1) 0.275 4.02 0.178 5.84
With the figures from Table 8, we can calculate the share of investors of the
first type as   a/(a+b):
January 1996 - January 19970.93/2.58 = 0.36
February 1997 - October 19970.38/1.26 = 0.30
These estimates are in agreement with the CB RF data on the share of foreign
participants in the GKO market: 30% and 18% for the two periods.
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2.5. The GKO futures market
In this section, we study the relationship between the GKO spot and futures
markets. The GKO futures market is a relatively new futures market in Russia.
The volume of this market decreased sharply in October 1997. The main points
of interest here are as follows: is the futures price an unbiased estimator of the
future GKO spot price? Are the risk premia statistically different from zero? If
so, what is the structure of the risk premia? If the risk premia are statistically
different for MICEX and MCSE, could it be explained by some institutional
differences between the two exchanges?
What follows is a short review of the history of the futures markets in Russia.
2.5.1. The Russian futures market
Trading futures contracts started in the Russian Federation with trading in
currency futures on the Moscow Commodity Exchange (MICEX) in October
1992. Now, nearly 15 exchanges trade futures, in Moscow, Sankt-Petersburg,
Nizhnii Novgorod, Vladivostok, and other cities.
Volume of futures trade in current prices (bill. non-denominated roubles)
1993 131.5
1994 6,127
1995 64,954
1996 45,300
During the period from 1993 to the first half of 1996, nearly 98% of the whole
futures market was trading in currency (US dollar) futures. The other 2% were
commodity futures. In the second half of 1996, trading started in GKO futures
and other GKO derivatives. In 1997, the most significant trading volumes in
GKO futures were at the Russian Exchange (REX), the Moscow Central Stock
Exchange (MCSE) and MICEX. By implicit estimate, 70% to 80% of futures
trading is produced by banks.
The structure of the futures market has changed significantly over time.
Between 1993 and 1995, almost all of the futures market consisted of currency
futures, but at the end of 1996 currency futures took only 15% of the total. At
this time, most of the futures were GKO futures. Since the second half of 1997,
stock futures have predominated on the futures market. Figure 12 presents the
dynamic structure of the futures section of the MICEX.
These changes in the structure of the futures market reflected changes in the
markets of the underlying assets (i.e. the introduction of a currency “corridor”,
the significantly decreased appeal of the currency futures markets for
speculators). Some institutional aspects played a role as well. The decline of
currency futures is essentially connected with the crash of the clearing house
of the MICEX in autumn 1995.
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2.5.2 The GKO market and the GKO futures market
Let us consider in detail futures on the secondary GKO market. Such GKO
futures contracts are traded at the MICEX, the MCSE and at other exchanges.
We take the MICEX and the MCSE for our study, because the largest part of
GKO futures is traded at these exchanges. In Appendix 6, one can find a short
description of the GKO futures contracts traded at these exchanges.
There are two questions that we consider below:
1) Is the price of the GKO futures contract Ft
n( )  an unbiased estimator of the
future price of the GKO issue St n+ ? Is there a risk premium existing on the
GKO futures market?
2) Is there a significant difference between the prices of GKO futures on the
two floors: MICEX and MCSE?
2.5.3. Risk premia
If risk-averse agents are present in the market, then the futures price could not
be equal to the expected future spot price, but will differ from the latter by the
risk premia:
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E S I Ft n t t
n
t
n[ | ] ( )( ) ( )+ = +1 p . (7)
Here, p t
n( )
 is the risk premium at time moment t for the futures contract with n
days to delivery; It - information set available at time t. For computation
reasons, it is often convenient to rewrite (7) in logarithms and to redefine the
risk premium as follows:
E s I st n t t
n
t
n[ | ] ( )( ) ( )+ = +1 p , (8)
where f F s St
n
t
n
t n t n
( ) ( )ln( ), ln( )= =+ + .
In order to check if the futures price is equal to the expected future spot price
and simultaneously estimate the risk premia, the following standard procedure
is used. We estimate the regression:
s f x ut n t
n
t t n
n
+ +- = ¢ +
( ) ( )b  , (9)
where xt - the variables from information set It If the null hypothesis that the
futures price is equal to the expected future spot price holds, then b = 0, and
errors are uncorrelated for lags greater or equal to n, i.e.
E u u k nt
n
t k
n[ ] ,( ) ( )+ = ³0 . Otherwise, we obtain the functional form of the risk
premia E s f E s f xt t n t
n
t t n t
n
t[ ] [ ]
( ) ( )
+ +- = - = ¢b  . We use as explanatory
variables for the risk premia in model (9) the variables ( ),( ) ( )f s ft
n
t t
n- .
Explanatory variables of this kind are often used in the related literature: Cuper
(1993), Fama (1984), Jabbour (1994), Peresetsky & Roon (1997).
To increase flexibility, we suppose that the intercept and the coefficients of
regressors ( ),( ) ( )f s ft
n
t t
n-  depend linearly on the time to delivery n. Leaving
aside observations with n < 6, we obtain the following regressions for the two
exchanges:
MICEX:(10)
E t s f
n f n f f s n f s
t n t
n
t
n
t
n
t
n
t t
n
t
+ - =
= + - - - - + -0 79 0 013 0 173 0 0028 0 49 0 00082
0 15 0 0019 0 034 0 0004 0 14 0 00041
. . . . . ( ) . ( )
( . ) ( . ) ( . ) ( . ) ( . ) ( . )
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MCSE: (11)
E t s f
n f n f f s n f s
t n t
n
t
n
t
n
t
n
t t
n
t
+ - =
= + - - - - + -0 43 0 30 0 095 0 0065 0 65 0 0079
0 31 0 0075 0 070 0 0016 0 18 0 0021
. . . . . ( ) . ( )
( . ) ( . ) ( . ) ( . ) ( . ) ( . )
It is easy to see that the homoscedasticity condition is violated for these
equations, since several futures contracts are traded simultaneously in one day
and, hence, errors for corresponding observations are correlated because they
contain common news that came in that day. Therefore equations (10) and
(11) were estimated with OLS, but then corrected for serial correlation by
Newey-West form with Parsen window size 60. (A preliminary analysis of the
auto-correlation function of the residuals of regressions (10) and (11) shows
that for greater lags correlations are not statistically different from 0.) The
output of the regressions is presented in Appendix 7.
In equation (11), all coefficients except the intercept are statistically different
from zero at the 95% confidence level. In equation (10), all coefficients except
the coefficient at n f st
n
t( )
( ) -  are statistically different from zero at the 99.9%
confidence level.
Therefore, the null hypothesis of no bias in the price of futures contracts as an
estimator of future spot price is rejected. The obtained risk premia is
statistically and economically different from 0 and highly time variant.
Comparing the two risk premia at the MICEX (10) and the MCSE (11), we see
that the signs and order of magnitude of the coefficients coincide. But the
coefficients of the regressors, which include time to delivery n f st
n
t( )
( ) - ,
n f nt
n( ) ,  are statistically different. Partially, it could be explained by a
difference in the data for the two exchanges. The mean time to delivery is
equal to 60 (standard deviation 46) for the MICEX and 33 (22) for the MCSE.
When comparing the values of the two risk premia (10) and (11) for the two
sets of data (MICEX and MCSE), the mean values of the risk premia (10) are
higher in both cases. The difference is statistically significant only for the
MCSE data. The average value of the MICEX risk premia (10) is higher than the
MCSE risk premia (11) by approximately 0.009.
The plots of the two risk premia are presented in Figures 13a and b. One can
see that the risk premia on the MICEX is positive for almost all observations.
Risk premia on the MCSE is also positive in most cases, but a lot of negative
values are observed as well. This asymmetry could be explained by the fact
that, at both exchanges (but especially the MICEX), most of the agents who
buy futures contracts are large GKO holders who hedge their positions on the
GKO market. The structure of the participants on the MCSE is more
heterogeneous, providing greater efficiency.
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Figure 13a. Risk premia, MCSE.
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Figure 13b. Risk premia, MICEX.
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The volumes of daily trading and the opening positions of the GKO futures are
both significantly higher at the MCSE than at the MICEX (see Figure 14). More
meaningful is a comparison of the ratio of the mean volume of trade to the
mean volume of the opening positions (see Figure 15). The difference between
the two exchanges is that the parameter is lower, but still significant over
nearly the whole period under consideration. This again supports the
hypothesis of the predominance of ‘hedgers’ on the MICEX. Speculators
provide a level of futures trading activity higher than ‘hedgers’ do. The level of
activity could be measured by the ratio of the mean volume of trade to the
mean volume of the opening positions.
Figure 14. Average daily volumes of GKO futures trade.
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The hypothesis of the predominance of ‘hedgers’ on the MICEX GKO futures
market is supported by the reliability of this exchange with its “pro-
government” status, the fact that the CB RF is the largest shareholder in the
exchange and the thoroughly designed system of the control of the risks of
different categories of participants.
The volumes of GKO futures trade decreased sharply in October 1997. Futures
trading activity switched to the futures in most liquid shares of Russian firms.
The rapid growth of the stock market in April-September 1997 stimulated
interest in stock futures.
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Figure 15. Ratio of the mean volume of trade to the mean volume of the
opening positions.
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2.6. The stock market and the GKO market
During 1996, one could observe the permanent growth of the volume of the
Russian stock market. But in their future prognosis of decreasing borrowing
costs the CB and MF still did not take the stock market into account. One of
the purposes of our research at that time was to show that the stock market
could set up natural restrictions to the efforts of the CB and MF in decreasing
borrowing costs. We show that, in the period October 1996 - October 1997,
the measure of integration between the two markets increased over time; that
means that there are big flows of capital between the two markets. This
supports our research hypotheses.
We study the structure of the Russian stock market itself, analyzing the degree
of integration between the different industrial sectors of the market and we
compare the structure of the Russian stock market with the structure of the
stock markets in the industrialized countries.
2.6.1. Causality tests for stock indices
Let us start with a causality test for the stock indices of different countries. We
calculate the Granger causality test for the daily investment returns in stock
indices. Firstly, we calculate Granger tests for pairs of indices from the set:
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Dow Jones index (DJCMP65, USA); RTS index (RSRTSIN, Russia); FAZ index
(FZAINDX, Germany); FTSE index (FTAALLSH, Great Britain).
Pairwise Granger Causality Tests
Sample: 10/10/1996 10/10/1997
Lags: 2
Null Hypothesis: Obs F-Statistic Probability
RSRTSIN does not Granger Cause DJCM P65 262 0.15968 0.85250
DJCMP65 does not Granger Cause RSRTSIN 18.0334 4.7E-08
FAZINDX does not Granger Cause DJCMP65 262 1.45550 0.23520
DJCMP65 does not Granger Cause FAZINDX 62.9517 0.00000
FTALLSH does not Granger Cause DJCMP65 262 2.04556 0.13141
DJCMP65 does not Granger Cause FTALLSH 8.70295 0.00022
FAZINDX does not Granger Cause RSRTSIN 262 3.70241 0.02599
RSRTSIN does not Granger Cause FAZINDX 2.18685 0.11435
FTALLSH does not Granger Cause RSRTSIN 262 .382884 0.01344
RSRTSIN does not Granger Cause FTALLSH 0.51492 0.59816
FTALLSH does not Granger Cause FAZINDX 262 11.9087 1.1E-05
FAZINDX does not Granger Cause FTALLSH 1.15578 0.31644
From the results of the Granger tests listed above, we can see the influence of
the Dow Jones index on the RTS, FAZ, and FTSE indices. FTSE and FAZ
indices have an impact on the RTS index as well. (We also obtain the finding
that the FTSE ‘causes’ the FAZ.)
From interviews with the participants on the Russian stock market, we found
out that their most commonly-used reference point is the Dow Jones index, as
an indicator of the world’s leading stock market. Most European stock indices
are correlated with the Dow Jones; that is why Russian traders prefer to use
the Dow Jones as their reference point. Note that the Russian stock market is
essentially internationalized. The most significant part of its agents are foreign
investors and speculators. Obviously, most of them in their activity use as their
reference point the behavior of their domestic stock indices and, first of all, the
Dow Jones index. Many Russian participants are oriented in their stock market
activity by the behavior of foreign investors, who have greater professional
experience and better information support.
2.6.2. Industry indices.
Consider the correlation of the daily returns of the industrial sector indices of
the Russian stock market (see Table 9). We use industrial sector indices that
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we ourselves have calculated from Russian Trading System (RTS) data for the
gas-oil (NFGZ), energy (ENERG) and telecommunications (SVZ) industry
sectors. The list of firms included in each of the indices is provided in Appendix
2. For comparison we calculated also the index of Russian “blue chip”
companies (BLCP – see the list of firms included in Appendix 2).
From Table 9, we can see that the correlation between the oil and the energy
industry indices is the biggest. These two indices are more closely related than
the others. Secondly, during the later period, all the correlations are higher.
This could mean that the stock market became more mature over time.
Table 9. Correlation of daily returns of the industry indices.
Correlation of returns 10/1/98 - 6/5/98
BLCP SVZS NFGZ ENERG
BLCP 1 0.37 0.92 0.79
SVZS 0.37 1 0.35 0.31
NFGZ 0.92 0.35 1 0.72
ENERG 0.79 0.31 0.72 1
Correlation of returns 10/10/96 -10/10/97
BLCP SVZS NFGZ ENERG
BLCP 1 0.26 0.82 0.75
SVZS 0.26 1 0.23 0.19
NFGZ 0.82 0.23 1 0.62
ENERG 0.75 0.19 0.62 1
Is the structure of the relationship between the different industrial sectors of
the Russian stock market close to the structure of the stock markets of the
industrialized countries? Table 10 shows the correlation between the daily
returns of the industry indices of the Russia, USA and Great Britain stock
markets.
Table 10. Correlation of daily returns of industry indices.
Russia USA Great Britain
Energy - Oil/gas 0.62 0.64 -
Energy - Telecommunications 0.19 0.47 -
Oil/gas - Telecommunications 0.23 0.22 0.22
Indices used in calculations:
Russia: ENERG, NFGZ,SVZS(RTS)
USA:S&PENRG, S&POILX, S&PTELE(S&P)
Great Britain:FTAOILI, FTATCOM(FTSE)
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From Table 10, one can see that the correlations between the daily returns of
different industry indices are approximately equal for the Russian, US and
Great Britain stock markets. This non-obvious result means that the factors of
the relationship between industry sectors in an industrial economy with a
mature stock market cause stable relations in the dynamics of the indices of
industry sectors. Moreover, the degree of relations is approximately the same
for different countries with the same level of technology. The energy and oil
industries are mono-product industries and have relatively small sets of basic
technology, similar between the US and Russia; this is why the dynamics of the
financial states of firms in these industries (and respectively their market
estimates as dynamics of industry indices) have a similar relationship between
the two countries. The pair “energy - telecommunications” is not of that case.
This could be explained by essential distinctions in the relationship between
these branches of industry in the US and Russian economies, as a result of the
technologically more advanced US telecommunications industry compared to
the Russian one. In addition, during the period under consideration, the
dynamics of the telecommunications index of the RTS was facing much
pressure from the gamble connected with the privatization of the biggest
Russian intertelecommunications holding company “Svyazinvest” (August
1997).
2.6.3. Inter-country correlations
Now let us consider the correlation between the daily returns in the stock
indices of different countries. Taking the Dow Jones index and a European
index, for example the DAX100, we found a rather low correlation – 0.28 (here
and below in this section, all calculations are related to the period 10.10.96 –
10.10.97). These two indices are related to two economies, so in general they
should not be highly correlated. But the low correlation could also be
calculated by two other factors. Firstly, indices are calculated based on the
price of shares in national currency, and to compare its behavior it would be
better to “correct” one of them, the DAX100, for example, by the USD/DM
exchange rate. However, such a “correction” in fact leads to a decreasing
correlation. The second factor is that the DJ and DAX indices are calculated
with a time delay of approximately 8 hours.
In order to reduce the influence of the second factor, we took two indices with
a small delay in time in order to compare their behavior after the “correction”
of one of them by the exchange rate. Correlations between the German and
Great Britain indices, “corrected’ to the sterling/DM indices are presented in
Table 11.
In Table 11 we can see that, in general, the correlation between the German
and GB indices decreased after the “correction”. The only index that does not
share this common behavior is FTAOILI, for which the “correction” slightly
increased the correlations. This could be interpreted by the large degree of
internationalization of the oil industry itself and the stock market sectors of the
oil industry shares respectively.
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Table 12 contains the correlations of the daily returns of the different stock
indices, grouped by countries. One can observe that the higher correlations
(0.81-0.99) are between indices related to the same country:
USA: Corr(SPCOMP,DJCMP65) = 0.96;
Germany: Corr(FAZINDX,DAX100I) =  0.92;
Great Britain: Corr(FTSE100,FTALLSH) = 0.99;
Russia:Corr(BLCP,RSRTSIN)  = 0.81.
It seems reasonable to suppose that the correlations of the daily returns of the
indices from two different countries with integrated economies should be rather
high. For example, Germany has the highest correlation with Austria (0.67),
France and England (0.41-0.54). England has a higher correlation with France
(0.60). Correlation of the daily returns of the US indices with Western European
indices is relatively low (0.20-0.36); this could be explained by a lower degree
of integration and by the time delay of 6-8 hours between the closing of the
exchanges in Europe and in the USA. The USA-Argentina correlation is 0.47,
while that between USA-Brazil is 0.37, which could be interpreted as a lower
level of integration compared to the integration between West European
countries. Between the developing countries, the highest correlations are
observed for the pairs Argentina-Brazil (0.50); Chile-Argentina (0.40); and
Singapore-Malaysia.
For Russia, the correlations are rather low. The highest correlation with the
industrialized countries (0.23) is with Germany - the main trading partner of
Russia – and also with Hungary (0.22-0.28). This could be implicit evidence of
the fact that the two countries (Russia and Hungary) have close (rather high)
degrees of openness of stock markets for foreign investors. Hungary has
correlations with Western European indices, which are higher than Russia’s. Its
economy is more integrated with (or more dependent on) the economies of
industrialized Western European countries than the Russian economy.
The RTS index is calculated from the dollar prices of shares. Therefore, the
only explanation of the almost zero correlation between the RTS index daily
returns and the daily returns of the US indices could be the weak integration
between the two markets, and the time delay of 8-10 hours between the
closing of the exchanges.
In Table 13 below, we compare the RTS index with the FAZ and the FTSE
indices, “corrected” (by the USD/DM and USD/BP exchange rates). It can be
seen that the “correction” does not increase the degree of correlation.
Table 13.
RSRTSIN RSRTSIN
FTALLSH 0.080 FAZINDX 0.204
FTALLSH, $ 0.031 FAZINDX, $ 0.188
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Time delay
Consider the hypothesis that the low correlation between the daily returns of
the US stock market indices and West European stock market indices is a
result of the time delay. Let us find the weight l which maximizes the
correlation between the weighted average of the current and the day before
daily returns of the Dow Jones index l*DJCMP65(t) + (1-l)* DJCMP65(t-1)
and the daily returns of the second chosen index. Resulted “optimal” weights
and correlations are presented in Table 14.
Table 14.
Country index correlation l
Japan JAPDOWA 0.238 0.100
Russia RSRTSIN 0.327 -0.009
Russia BLCP 0.333 0.180
Germany FAZINDX 0.553 0.300
Germany DAX100I 0.535 0.360
France FRCAC40 0.417 0.631
Gr.Britain FTALLSH 0.441 0.556
Gr.Britain FTSE100 0.441 0.586
Brazil BRBOVES 0.358 0.799
From Table 14, we can see that “optimal” l are in good agreement with the
geographical placement of countries. However the values of l are smaller than
should be derived from the geography, which could be explained by the
leading position of the Dow Jones index in comparison with the other indices.
2.6.4.Integration of the GKO, currency and stock markets
As a first step, we calculate the matrix of the correlation of the daily returns of
the indices of the three markets (see Table 15).
Table 15. Correlation 10.10.96 – 10.10.97
BLCP RSRTSIN RESI GKOIVAN RTBI MICEX MB
BLCP 1 0.81 0.58 0.08 0.11 0.08 0.09
RSRTSIN 0.81 1 0.49 0.04 0.05 0.13 0.11
RESI 0.58 0.49 1 0.10 0.11 0.08 0.02
GKOIVAN 0.08 0.04 0.10 1 0.83 0.02 0.08
RTBI 0.11 0.05 0.11 0.83 1 0.06 0.10
MICEX 0.08 0.13 0.08 0.02 0.06 1 0.63
MB 0.09 0.11 0.02 0.08 0.10 0.63 1
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In Table 15, one can see the high correlation within the groups of indices, the
reflected behavior within the same market. The presented indices are BLCP,
RSRTSIN, RESI (stock market, RTS); GKOIVAN, RTBI (GKO market) and
MICEX, MB at– rouble/dollar exchange rate on the MICEX and on the over-the-
counter market. RESI and RTBI indices are calculated by RINACO, GKOIVAN,
and BLCP - by one of the authors (A.Ivanter), and the RESI is the official index
of the RTS.
The correlation between the daily returns of the indices, which belong to the
different markets, is very low. It could be explained by the low integration
between these markets, or by time delays. To study the impact of one index on
another, we ran Granger causality tests.
Granger causality tests
The results of the Granger causality tests applied to the indices listed above
are presented in Appendix 9. Assuming a 98% confidence level, we obtained
the following causal relationships:
MB=>MICEX,  MB=>RTBI, MB=>BLCP, MB=>RSRTSIN,
MB=>RESI, MICEX =>BLCP,  MICEX=>RSRTSIN,
MICEX=>RESI, MICEX=>GKOIVAN, GKOIVAN=>MICEX,
RESI=>RSRTSIN,BLCP=>RSRTSIN,
or, summarizing all these relationships:
GKO market <==> currency market ==> stock market
2.6.5.Integration of the GKO and the stock (RTS) markets
To study integration between the GKO market and the stock market (RTS), let
us take the indices GKOIVAN and BLCP. GKOIVAN is calculated as the
weighted average of quotes of GKO issues with weights equal to the current
capitalization of the issues. The BLCP index (blue chips) is calculated from
original RTS data using the six most liquid stocks on the RTS: RAO “ES
Russia”, NK “LUKoil”, “Mosenergo”, “Surgutneftegaz”, "Rostelekom”, and
“Norilskii Nikel”. The BLCP Index is calculated as the weighted average of the
quotes of the stocks with weights corresponding to the current capitalization of
these firms.
Consider the model of convergence of daily returns of these two indices
(markets):
DX(t) = const + m X(t-1) + et, (12)
where X(t) is the difference between the daily returns of the markets,
X(t) = ln(BLCP(t)/BLCP(t-1)) - ln(GKOIVAN(t)/GKOIVAN(t-1)).
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The GARCH(1,1) estimation for model (12) for the period 10.10.96 - 10.10.97
is presented below:
ARCH // Dependent Variable is D(X)
Sample: 186 436
Observations included: 251
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.
C 0.000735 0.001554 0.472818 0.6368
X(-1)- 0.768658 0.067768 -11.34244 0.0000
Variance Equation
C 5.14E-05 2.14E-05 2.401389 0.0171
ARCH(1) 0.185086 0.079218 2.336398 0.0203
GARCH(1) 0.729561 0.087511 8.336813 0.0000
R-squared 0.379228 Mean dependent var -0.000341
Adjusted R-squared 0.369134 S.D. dependent var 0.028765
S.E. of regression 0.022847 Akaike info criterion -7.538131
Sum squared resid 0.128411 Schwarz criterion -7.467903
Log likelihood 603.4872 F-statistic 37.57023
Durbin-Watson stat 1.916563 Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000
The estimated value of the “discrepancy” measure m is equal to 0.77, which is
lower than the value of 0.88 obtained earlier for the comparison of the
interbank loans market for the interbank currency market for “today” and
“tomorrow” contracts.
The graph of the conditional standard deviation for model (12) is presented in
Figure 16. The two peaks on the graph correspond to the 30 May 1996 and 9
July 1997. One can see the stabilization of the two markets after the
presidential elections in summer 1996.
In order to study the dynamics of the “discrepancy” measure m over time, we
ran rolling regression with window size 30, which approximately corresponds to
45 days. The graph of the estimates for model (12), with a rolling regression
standard deviation of error, is presented in Figure 17. On this graph, one can
see a peak on 8 July 1996. Taking into account the window size, this
corresponds to the period of market instability and uncertainty related to the
presidential elections. Since August 1996, the market started to stabilize, and
the standard deviation decreased sharply in that month.
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Figure 16.
Conditional standard deviation
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The graph of the estimated coefficient m of model (12) and its 95% confidence
limits is presented in Figure 18. Here, the rolling regression window size is
equal to 100 observations.
In the graph (Figure 18), one can see jumps on 23.10.96 and during 29.11.96 
- 5.12.96. Both these jumps could be connected to the beginning of futures
trading in the highly liquid stocks on the MICEX, which leads to the
destabilization of relations between the GKO, currency and stock markets. We
can also point to the temporary period of depressing of the integration
between the two markets at the end of 1996-beginning of 1997. The sharp
jump observed in October 1997 is connected with the first wave of the Russian
financial crisis, connected in turn with the financial crisis in South-East Asia.
During almost the whole period, m is statistically different from 1.
Figure 18.
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R T S G K O M U L o w u p p e r
The increased integration between the GKO and the stock market led to the
situation when the CB RF could not lower GKO returns (the costs of borrowing
of the Ministry of Finance) significantly below the returns on the stock market.
This conclusion is supported by the sharp growth of volumes and activity on
the stock market, which was, observed during the second half of 1997. In
September 1997, just before the first wave of the “Asian” financial crisis, the
capitalization of the Russian stock market grew to 150 billion dollars; at the
same time, GKO-OFZ market capitalization was nearly 55 billion dollars.
Although, due to lower liquidity, the average daily volume of trade was still
lower on the stock market – by nearly 0.5 billion dollars (nearly 1 billion dollars
at the same time on the GKO market and 1-1.5 billion dollars on the currency
(including the over-the-counter) market) – it is possible to state that the stock
market became a significant segment of the Russian financial market.
Respectively, we observe an increasing level of integration between the
dynamics of the indicators of the GKO, stock and currency markets.
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III.CONCLUSION
In this paper, we have studied the integration of the segments of the Russian
financial market. More thoroughly, we considered the GKO market, which plays
the outstanding role not only due to its volume, but due to its role for the
government and investors. We examined the relations of the GKO market with
the Russian stock market, the currency (spot and forward) markets and the
GKO futures market. It was shown that integration between the GKO and the
stock markets increased over time, and therefore the stock market could
provide restrictions on the efforts of the CB RF to decrease GKO yields. The
risk premium was present on the GKO futures market. The risk premium is of
obvious interest for Russian and foreign investors, as it affects the costs/profits
connected with hedging their positions on the GKO market. It is of interest to
the RF government, as an indicator of the expectations of investors, and
consequently the future spot price.
The boundary of our research was October 1997. The reaction of the different
sectors of the Russian financial market to the “Asian” financial crisis was
remarkably sharp and prolonged. Note that there was not only a quantitative
market reaction, in the significant increasing of interest rates (the refinancing
rate of the CB RF, yields at the GKO market, interbank loan rates), but a
qualitative changing of the structure of the sectors of the Russian financial
market and the structure of their mutual relations. For example, in November
1997 - January 1998, a significant decrease in futures trade was observed at
the MICEX, which was caused by a temporary prevention of market-makers
from carrying out their functions (in agreement with the MICEX). The role of the
MICEX as a center for hedging the dollar yield of investments in the GKO
during this period decreased and the ‘hedgers’ moved to the over-the-counter
forward market. At the end of March 1998, foreign investors were admitted to
the futures market of the MICEX. Since the end of April 1998, futures trade in
the rouble started at the Chicago Mercantile Exchange. All these events could
correct the obtained relationships but, as the situation is still unstable and the
time series are short, the analysis of this new situation will be available later,
after a certain period of stabilization.
At the same time, it would be of interest to study the functioning of the
segments of the Russian financial market during the crisis. It seems to be of
interest to estimate the risk premia for a possible rouble devaluation, which is
included by market participants in the yields of rouble assets during the crisis
period.
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IV. APPENDICES
Appendix 1.  Ordered list of GKO issues.
Issue Name Auction Day Maturity Day Days to
Maturity
SU21001RMFS0 18-May-93 Tuesday 17-Aug-93 Tuesday 91
SU21002RMFS9 15-Jun-93 Tuesday 21-Sep-93 Tuesday 98
SU21003RMFS7 20-Jul-93 Tuesday 19-Oct-93 Tuesday 91
SU21004RMFS5 17-Aug-93 Tuesday 16-Nov-93 Tuesday 91
SU21005RMFS2 21-Sep-93 Tuesday 21-Dec-93 Tuesday 91
SU21006RMFS 19-Oct-93 Tuesday 18-Jan-94 Tuesday 91
SU21007RMFS 16-Nov-93 Tuesday 15-Feb-94 Tuesday 91
SU21008RMFS 21-Dec-93 Tuesday 15-Mar-94 Tuesday 84
SU21009RMFS 18-Jan-94 Tuesday 19-Apr-94 Tuesday 91
SU21010RMFS 15-Feb-94 Tuesday 17-May-94 Tuesday 91
SU21011RMFS 15-Mar-94 Tuesday 21-Jun-94 Tuesday 98
SU22001RMFS 22-Dec-93 Wednesday 22-Jun-94 Wednesday 182
SU21012RMFS 19-Apr-94 Tuesday 19-Jul-94 Tuesday 91
SU21013RMFS 17-May-94 Tuesday 16-Aug-94 Tuesday 91
SU21014RMFS 21-Jun-94 Tuesday 20-Sep-94 Tuesday 91
SU22002RMFS 16-Mar-94 Wednesday 21-Sep-94 Wednesday 189
SU21015RMFS 19-Jul-94 Tuesday 18-Oct-94 Tuesday 91
SU21016RMFS 2-Aug-94 Tuesday 1-Nov-94 Tuesday 91
SU22003RMFS 18-May-94 Wednesday 8-Nov-94 Tuesday 174
SU21017RMFS 16-Aug-94 Tuesday 22-Nov-94 Tuesday 98
SU21018RMFS 6-Sep-94 Tuesday 6-Dec-94 Tuesday 91
SU22004RMFS 22-Jun-94 Wednesday 13-Dec-94 Tuesday 174
SU21019RMFS 20-Sep-94 Tuesday 21-Dec-94 Wednesday 92
SU21020RMFS 6-Oct-94 Thursday 4-Jan-95 Wednesday 90
SU22005RMFS 12-Jul-94 Tuesday 10-Jan-95 Tuesday 182
SU21021RMFS 13-Oct-94 Thursday 11-Jan-95 Wednesday 90
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SU21022RMFS 18-Oct-94 Tuesday 18-Jan-95 Wednesday 92
SU21023RMFS 1-Nov-94 Tuesday 1-Feb-95 Wednesday 92
SU22006RMFS 9-Aug-94 Tuesday 14-Feb-95 Tuesday 189
SU21024RMFS 22-Nov-94 Tuesday 15-Feb-95 Wednesday 85
SU21025RMFS 6-Dec-94 Tuesday 1-Mar-95 Wednesday 85
SU22007RMFS 21-Sep-94 Wednesday 8-Mar-95 Wednesday 168
SU21026RMFS 21-Dec-94 Wednesday 15-Mar-95 Wednesday 84
SU21027RMFS 5-Jan-95 Thursday 5-Apr-95 Wednesday 90
SU21029RMFS 25-Jan-95 Wednesday 12-Apr-95 Wednesday 77
SU21028RMFS 11-Jan-95 Wednesday 19-Apr-95 Wednesday 98
SU21030RMFS 1-Feb-95 Wednesday 3-May-95 Wednesday 91
SU22008RMFS 8-Nov-94 Tuesday 10-May-95 Wednesday 183
SU21031RMFS 15-Feb-95 Wednesday 17-May-95 Wednesday 91
SU21032RMFS 1-Mar-95 Wednesday 7-Jun-95 Wednesday 98
SU22009RMFS 13-Dec-94 Tuesday 14-Jun-95 Wednesday 183
SU21033RMFS 15-Mar-95 Wednesday 21-Jun-95 Wednesday 98
SU21034RMFS 5-Apr-95 Wednesday 5-Jul-95 Wednesday 91
SU21038RMFS 25-May-95 Thursday 12-Jul-95 Wednesday 48
SU21035RMFS 19-Apr-95 Wednesday 19-Jul-95 Wednesday 91
SU21036RMFS 4-May-95 Thursday 2-Aug-95 Wednesday 90
SU22010RMFS 8-Feb-95 Wednesday 9-Aug-95 Wednesday 182
SU21037RMFS 17-May-95 Wednesday 16-Aug-95 Wednesday 91
SU21039RMFS 7-Jun-95 Wednesday 6-Sep-95 Wednesday 91
SU22011RMFS 9-Mar-95 Thursday 13-Sep-95 Wednesday 188
SU21040RMFS 21-Jun-95 Wednesday 20-Sep-95 Wednesday 91
SU21041RMFS 5-Jul-95 Wednesday 4-Oct-95 Wednesday 91
SU22012RMFS 12-Apr-95 Wednesday 11-Oct-95 Wednesday 182
SU21042RMFS 19-Jul-95 Wednesday 18-Oct-95 Wednesday 91
SU23001RMFS 26-Oct-94 Wednesday 25-Oct-95 Wednesday 364
SU21043RMFS 2-Aug-95 Wednesday 1-Nov-95 Wednesday 91
SU22013RMFS 11-May-95 Thursday 8-Nov-95 Wednesday 181
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SU21044RMFS 16-Aug-95 Wednesday 15-Nov-95 Wednesday 91
SU21045RMFS 6-Sep-95 Wednesday 6-Dec-95 Wednesday 91
SU22014RMFS 28-Jun-95 Wednesday 13-Dec-95 Wednesday 168
SU21046RMFS 20-Sep-95 Wednesday 20-Dec-95 Wednesday 91
SU21047RMFS 4-Oct-95 Wednesday 3-Jan-96 Wednesday 91
SU21048RMFS 18-Oct-95 Wednesday 17-Jan-96 Wednesday 91
SU21049RMFS 25-Oct-95 Wednesday 31-Jan-96 Wednesday 98
SU21050RMFS 31-Oct-95 Tuesday 6-Feb-96 Tuesday 98
SU22015RMFS 9-Aug-95 Wednesday 14-Feb-96 Wednesday 189
SU21051RMFS 15-Nov-95 Wednesday 21-Feb-96 Wednesday 98
SU21052RMFS 29-Nov-95 Wednesday 28-Feb-96 Wednesday 91
SU21053RMFS 6-Dec-95 Wednesday 6-Mar-96 Wednesday 91
SU22016RMFS 13-Sep-95 Wednesday 13-Mar-96 Wednesday 182
SU21054RMFS 20-Dec-95 Wednesday 20-Mar-96 Wednesday 91
SU21055RMFS 27-Dec-95 Wednesday 27-Mar-96 Wednesday 91
SU21056RMFS 3-Jan-96 Wednesday 3-Apr-96 Wednesday 91
SU22017RMFS 11-Oct-95 Wednesday 10-Apr-96 Wednesday 182
SU21057RMFS 17-Jan-96 Wednesday 17-Apr-96 Wednesday 91
SU21058RMFS 7-Feb-96 Wednesday 30-Apr-96 Tuesday 83
SU22018RMFS 8-Nov-95 Wednesday 8-May-96 Wednesday 182
SU21062RMFS 26-Mar-96 Tuesday 15-May-96 Wednesday 50
SU21059RMFS 28-Feb-96 Wednesday 29-May-96 Wednesday 91
SU21060RMFS 6-Mar-96 Wednesday 5-Jun-96 Wednesday 91
SU22019RMFS 13-Dec-95 Wednesday 12-Jun-96 Wednesday 182
SU21061RMFS 20-Mar-96 Wednesday 19-Jun-96 Wednesday 91
SU21063RMFS 3-Apr-96 Wednesday 3-Jul-96 Wednesday 91
SU22020RMFS 31-Jan-96 Wednesday 10-Jul-96 Wednesday 161
SU21064RMFS 17-Apr-96 Wednesday 17-Jul-96 Wednesday 91
SU21065RMFS 30-Apr-96 Tuesday 31-Jul-96 Wednesday 92
SU21066RMFS 8-May-96 Wednesday 7-Aug-96 Wednesday 91
SU22021RMFS 14-Feb-96 Wednesday 14-Aug-96 Wednesday 182
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SU22022RMFS 21-Feb-96 Wednesday 21-Aug-96 Wednesday 182
SU22026RMFS 27-Mar-96 Wednesday 28-Aug-96 Wednesday 154
SU22023RMFS 6-Mar-96 Wednesday 4-Sep-96 Wednesday 182
SU22024RMFS 13-Mar-96 Wednesday 11-Sep-96 Wednesday 182
SU22025RMFS 20-Mar-96 Wednesday 18-Sep-96 Wednesday 182
SU22033RMFS 29-May-96 Wednesday 25-Sep-96 Wednesday 119
SU22027RMFS 3-Apr-96 Wednesday 2-Oct-96 Wednesday 182
SU22028RMFS 10-Apr-96 Wednesday 9-Oct-96 Wednesday 182
SU22029RMFS 17-Apr-96 Wednesday 16-Oct-96 Wednesday 182
SU22030RMFS 24-Apr-96 Wednesday 23-Oct-96 Wednesday 182
SU22031RMFS 30-Apr-96 Tuesday 30-Oct-96 Wednesday 183
SU22032RMFS 8-May-96 Wednesday 6-Nov-96 Wednesday 182
SU21067RMFS 24-Jul-96 Wednesday 13-Nov-96 Wednesday 112
SU21068RMFS 7-Aug-96 Wednesday 20-Nov-96 Wednesday 105
SU22034RMFS 29-May-96 Wednesday 27-Nov-96 Wednesday 182
SU22035RMFS 5-Jun-96 Wednesday 4-Dec-96 Wednesday 182
SU22036RMFS 13-Jun-96 Thursday 11-Dec-96 Wednesday 181
SU21069RMFS 14-Aug-96 Wednesday 18-Dec-96 Wednesday 126
SU22037RMFS 19-Jun-96 Wednesday 25-Dec-96 Wednesday 189
SU21070RMFS 4-Sep-96 Wednesday 3-Jan-97 Friday 121
SU22038RMFS 26-Jun-96 Wednesday 8-Jan-97 Wednesday 196
SU22039RMFS 4-Jul-96 Thursday 15-Jan-97 Wednesday 195
SU21071RMFS 25-Sep-96 Wednesday 22-Jan-97 Wednesday 119
SU22040RMFS 10-Jul-96 Wednesday 29-Jan-97 Wednesday 203
SU22041RMFS 17-Jul-96 Wednesday 5-Feb-97 Wednesday 203
SU22042RMFS 24-Jul-96 Wednesday 12-Feb-97 Wednesday 203
SU22043RMFS 31-Jul-96 Wednesday 19-Feb-97 Wednesday 203
SU22044RMFS 7-Aug-96 Wednesday 5-Mar-97 Wednesday 210
SU22056RMFS 30-Oct-96 Wednesday 12-Mar-97 Wednesday 133
SU22045RMFS 14-Aug-96 Wednesday 19-Mar-97 Wednesday 217
SU22046RMFS 21-Aug-96 Wednesday 26-Mar-97 Wednesday 217
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SU22047RMFS 28-Aug-96 Wednesday 2-Apr-97 Wednesday 217
SU22048RMFS 4-Sep-96 Wednesday 9-Apr-97 Wednesday 217
SU22049RMFS 11-Sep-96 Wednesday 16-Apr-97 Wednesday 217
SU22055RMFS 23-Oct-96 Wednesday 23-Apr-97 Wednesday 182
SU22050RMFS 18-Sep-96 Wednesday 30-Apr-97 Wednesday 224
SU22063RMFS 18-Dec-96 Wednesday 7-May-97 Wednesday 140
SU22052RMFS 2-Oct-96 Wednesday 14-May-97 Wednesday 224
SU22051RMFS 25-Sep-96 Wednesday 21-May-97 Wednesday 238
SU21072RMFS 26-Feb-97 Wednesday 28-May-97 Wednesday 91
SU22053RMFS 9-Oct-96 Wednesday 4-Jun-97 Wednesday 238
SU22066RMFS 8-Jan-97 Wednesday 11-Jun-97 Wednesday 154
SU22054RMFS 16-Oct-96 Wednesday 18-Jun-97 Wednesday 245
SU22057RMFS 6-Nov-96 Wednesday 25-Jun-97 Wednesday 231
SU22062RMFS 11-Dec-96 Wednesday 2-Jul-97 Wednesday 203
SU22069RMFS 5-Feb-97 Wednesday 16-Jul-97 Wednesday 161
SU22064RMFS 25-Dec-96 Wednesday 23-Jul-97 Wednesday 210
SU22058RMFS 13-Nov-96 Wednesday 30-Jul-97 Wednesday 259
SU22073RMFS 19-Feb-97 Wednesday 6-Aug-97 Wednesday 168
SU22061RMFS 4-Dec-96 Wednesday 13-Aug-97 Wednesday 252
SU22065RMFS 5-Jan-97 Sunday 20-Aug-97 Wednesday 227
SU22071RMFS 12-Feb-97 Wednesday 27-Aug-97 Wednesday 196
SU22059RMFS 20-Nov-96 Wednesday 3-Sep-97 Wednesday 287
SU22076RMFS 19-Mar-97 Wednesday 10-Sep-97 Wednesday 175
SU22060RMFS 27-Nov-96 Wednesday 17-Sep-97 Wednesday 294
SU21074RMFS 11-Jun-97 Wednesday 24-Sep-97 Wednesday 105
SU22067RMFS 8-Jan-97 Wednesday 1-Oct-97 Wednesday 266
SU22068RMFS 15-Jan-97 Wednesday 8-Oct-97 Wednesday 266
SU22082RMFS 7-May-97 Wednesday 15-Oct-97 Wednesday 161
SU22079RMFS 2-Apr-97 Wednesday 22-Oct-97 Wednesday 203
SU22075RMFS 5-Mar-97 Wednesday 29-Oct-97 Wednesday 238
SU22084RMFS 21-May-97 Wednesday 5-Nov-97 Wednesday 168
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SU22083RMFS 14-May-97 Wednesday 12-Nov-97 Wednesday 182
SU22070RMFS 5-Feb-97 Wednesday 19-Nov-97 Wednesday 287
SU22072RMFS 12-Feb-97 Wednesday 26-Nov-97 Wednesday 287
SU22078RMFS 26-Mar-97 Wednesday 3-Dec-97 Wednesday 252
SU22074RMFS 19-Feb-97 Wednesday 10-Dec-97 Wednesday 294
SU21087RMFS 20-Aug-97 Wednesday 17-Dec-97 Wednesday 119
SU22080RMFS 16-Apr-97 Wednesday 24-Dec-97 Wednesday 252
SU21091RMFS 17-Sep-97 Wednesday 7-Jan-98 Wednesday 112
SU22077RMFS 19-Mar-97 Wednesday 14-Jan-98 Wednesday 301
SU21095RMFS 8-Oct-97 Wednesday 21-Jan-98 Wednesday 105
SU21081RMFS 30-Jul-97 Wednesday 28-Jan-98 Wednesday 182
SU21084RMFS 13-Aug-97 Wednesday 11-Feb-98 Wednesday 182
SU23002RMFS 26-Feb-97 Wednesday 18-Feb-98 Wednesday 357
SU21073RMFS 4-Jun-97 Wednesday 25-Feb-98 Wednesday 266
SU23003RMFS 12-Mar-97 Wednesday 4-Mar-98 Wednesday 357
SU22081RMFS 30-Apr-97 Wednesday 18-Mar-98 Wednesday 322
SU21093RMFS 24-Sep-97 Wednesday 25-Mar-98 Wednesday 182
SU22085RMFS 28-May-97 Wednesday 1-Apr-98 Wednesday 308
SU23004RMFS 9-Apr-97 Wednesday 8-Apr-98 Wednesday 364
SU23005RMFS 23-Apr-97 Wednesday 22-Apr-98 Wednesday 364
SU23006RMFS 7-May-97 Wednesday 6-May-98 Wednesday 364
SU23007RMFS 21-May-97 Wednesday 20-May-98 Wednesday 364
SU21075RMFS 11-Jun-97 Wednesday 10-Jun-98 Wednesday 364
SU21076RMFS 18-Jun-97 Wednesday 17-Jun-98 Wednesday 364
SU21077RMFS 25-Jun-97 Wednesday 24-Jun-98 Wednesday 364
SU21078RMFS 2-Jul-97 Wednesday 1-Jul-98 Wednesday 364
SU21079RMFS 16-Jul-97 Wednesday 15-Jul-98 Wednesday 364
SU21080RMFS 23-Jul-97 Wednesday 22-Jul-98 Wednesday 364
SU21082RMFS 30-Jul-97 Wednesday 29-Jul-98 Wednesday 364
SU21083RMFS 6-Aug-97 Wednesday 5-Aug-98 Wednesday 364
SU21085RMFS 13-Aug-97 Wednesday 12-Aug-98 Wednesday 364
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SU21086RMFS 20-Aug-97 Wednesday 19-Aug-98 Wednesday 364
SU21088RMFS 27-Aug-97 Wednesday 26-Aug-98 Wednesday 364
SU21089RMFS 3-Sep-97 Wednesday 2-Sep-98 Wednesday 364
SU21090RMFS 10-Sep-97 Wednesday 9-Sep-98 Wednesday 364
SU21092RMFS 17-Sep-97 Wednesday 16-Sep-98 Wednesday 364
SU21094RMFS 1-Oct-97 Wednesday 30-Sep-98 Wednesday 364
Appendix 2.
Shares selected for industry indices calculation.
Oil and gas index  NFGZ.
“Komineft” NK "LUKoil" "Noyabrskneftegaz"
"Purneftegaz" "Surgutneftegaz" "Tomskneft"
"Yuganskneftegaz" "Chernogorneft" "Kondpetroleum"
"Megionneftegaz" "Orenburgneft" "Sakhalinmornneftegaz"
"Tatneft" YUKOS
Index of telecommunications industry SVZS.
Rostelekom" "Elektrosvyaz"", Novosibirsk
MGTS "Murmanskelektrosvyaz"
Sankt-Petersburg MMT Sankt-Petersburg telephone
"Uralsvyazinform" "Elektrosvyaz", Rostov
"Elektrosvyaz", Irkutsk "Elektrosvyaz", Krasnoyarsk
"KUbanelektrosvyaz" "Svyazinform", Nizhni Novgorod
"Svyazinform", Chelyabinsk “Tyumentelekom"
"Uraltelekom" "Khantymansiiskykokptelekom"
Energy industry index  ENERG.
RAO “ES Russia" "Irkutskenergo" "Mosenergo"
"Chelyabenergo " "Krasnoyarskenergo" "Lenenergo"
"Novosibirskenergo" "Permenergo" "Samaraenergo"
"Sverdlovskenergo" "Kolenergo" "Kubanenergo"
"Bashkirenergo" "Rosenergo” "Saratovenergo"
"Kuzbassenergo"
Blue chips index  BLCP.
RAO “ES Russia", NK "LUKoil", "Mosenergo",
"Surgutneftegaz", "Rostelekom", "Norilskii Nikel"
All indices are calculated for the period 10.01.1996 - 06.05.1998, with a base
value of 100 for the first day; weights are proportional to market capitalization.
APPENDICES
65
APPENDIX 3.
GARCH(1,1) estimation of model (1) for  XT=rDM-rRBEX.
ARCH // Dependent Variable is D(XDMRBEX)
Sample: 945 1264
Included observations: 320
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.
C 0.000105 0.000296 0.356395 0.7218
XDMRBEX(-1) -1.017305 0.052594 -19.34260 0.0000
Variance Equation
C 4.56E-07 2.29E-07 1.993479 0.0471
ARCH(1) 0.022262 0.021320 1.044173 0.2972
GARCH(1) 0.967505 0.021416 45.17678 0.0000
R-squared 0.528922 Mean dependent var -7.63E-05
Adjusted R-squared 0.522940 S.D. dependent var 0.008435
S.E. of regression 0.005826 Akaike info criterion -10.27532
Sum squared resid 0.010692 Schwarz criterion -10.21644
Log likelihood 1207.189 F-statistic 88.41974
Durbin-Watson stat 2.043741 Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000
GARCH (1,1) estimation of model (1) for XT=rBP-rRBEX.
ARCH // Dependent Variable is D(XBPRBEX)
Sample: 945 1264
Included observations: 320
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.
C 0.000816 0.000299 2.729280 0.0067
XBPRBEX(-1) -0.998887 0.057126 -17.48569 0.0000
Variance Equation
C 3.24E-07 1.92E-07 1.681351 0.0937
ARCH(1) 0.039897 0.015136 2.635933 0.0088
GARCH(1) 0.954304 0.016381 58.25812 0.0000
R-squared 0.480183 Mean dependent var 1.57E-05
Adjusted R-squared 0.473582 S.D. dependent var 0.007316
S.E. of regression 0.005308 Akaike info criterion -10.46142
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Sum squared resid 0.008876 Schwarz criterion -10.40254
Log likelihood 1236.227 F-statistic 72.74562
Durbin-Watson stat 1.914212 Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000
GARCH(1,1) estimation of model (1) for XT= rDM-rBP.
ARCH // Dependent Variable is D(XDMBP)
Date: 05.02.98   Time: 15:53
Sample(adjusted): 3 1264
Included observations: 1262 after adjusting endpoints
Convergence achieved after 39 iterations
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.
C 0.000242 0.000174 1.391199 0.1644
XDMBP 1.250944 0.015490 80.75905 0.0000
Variance Equation
C 1.15E-05 1.96E-06 5.853466 0.0000
ARCH(1) 0.217537 0.021295 10.21564 0.0000
GARCH(1) 0.528451 0.053543 19.869698 0.0000
R-squared 0.549147 Mean dependent var -9.67E-06
Adjusted R-squared 0.547712 S.D. dependent var 0.010011
S.E. of regression 0.006732 Akaike info criterion -9.997666
Sum squared resid 0.056975 Schwarz criterion -9.977299
Log likelihood 597.041 F-statistic 382.7617
Durbin-Watson stat 1.738276 Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000
APPENDIX 4.
GARCH(1,1) estimation of model (3).
ARCH // Dependent Variable is XT-XT(-1)
Included observations: 332 after adjusting endpoints
Bollerslev-Wooldrige robust standard errors & covariance
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.
C 8.174406 0.793703 10.29908 0.0000
XT(-1) -0.832748 0.066921 -12.44369 0.0000
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Variance Equation
C 0.591953 0.799181 0.740700 0.4594
ARCH(1) 0.058339 0.029229 1.995915 0.0468
GARCH(1) 0.931500 0.033531 27.78037 0.0000
R-squared 0.440629 Mean dependent var -0.051887
Adjusted R-squared 0.433786 S.D. dependent var 14.26277
S.E. of regression 10.73233 Akaike info criterion 4.761467
Sum squared resid 37664.80 Schwarz criterion 4.818773
Log likelihood -1206.181 F-statistic 64.39619
Durbin-Watson stat 2.138823 Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000
APPENDIX 5.
Graph of the conditional standard deviation of model (3) GARCH(1,1)
estimation.
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APPENDIX 6.
Description of GKO futures contracts
MICEX futures contracts on a one-year GKO issue.
Base activeGKO issue with 365 days to delivery.
Standard quantity10 GKOs
ContractsNearest 3 months from the set:
March, June, September, December
Day of deliveryThird Tuesday of the month.
Last trading dayThe working day before the day to delivery.
Final accounting price (Pf):
Price of the one-year GKO on the day to delivery, calculated by the formula:
Pf=100/(1 + Ymax/100),where Ymax=maxYi,
Yi=100(100/Pi - 1)365/Ti,
Pi  - weighted price of the i-th GKO issue from the accounting base at the
delivery. The accounting base consists of the GKO issues which at the delivery
day have a period to delivery between 250 and 370 days.
Deliverypayment equal to 100 x (Pf - Pt), where Pt - price of contract
Commission0.2 roubles per contract
Deposit margin129.6 roubles per contract
MCSE futures contract on GKO issues.
Subject of contract.
Weighted average of the G-issue of GKO (OFZ), fixed at the secondary GKO
trade on the MICEX at the day to delivery.
Standard quantity 1 GKO issue.
Day to delivery is determined by the Clearing House on the introduction of the
contract. The last trading day coincides with the day to delivery. Delivery of the
contract is done by a transfer of the margin of variation, calculated on the
basis of the closing price of the last day of trading of the GKO futures contract
at the MCSE and the weighted average of the price of the GKO issue fixed at
the day to delivery of the MICEX.
If, at the day to delivery, there was no trading on the GKO and OFZ on the
MICEX, then the delivery price is determined as follows: P = Pi x (1 + Y/100%
* t/365), where P is price of delivery, Pi - weighted average of the price of the
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GKO issue at the MICEX on the day before the day to delivery; Y - yield to
maturity, calculated by the Pi - weighted average of the price of the GKO issue
at the MICEX on the day before the day to delivery; t = T - Ti, where T is day to
delivery, and Ti is the last trading day on the MICEX before the day to delivery.
APPENDIX 7.
Risk premia at MICEX and MCSE.
MICEX (n>5)
Ordinary Least Squares Estimation
Based on Newey-West adjusted S.E. Parzen weights, truncation lag= 60
Dependent variable is DIF1
 640 observations used for estimation from    1 to  640
Regressor Coefficient Standard Error T-Ratio[Prob]
C .78566 .15043 5.2227[.000]
N .013229 .0018601 7.1121[.000]
F -.17266 .033573 -5.1427[.000]
NF -.0027998 .4009E-3 -6.9838[.000]
DIF2 -.48850 .13807 -3.5379[.000]
NDIF2 .8210E-3 .4130E-3 1.9879[.047]
MCSE (n>5)
Ordinary Least Squares Estimation
Based on Newey-West adjusted S.E. Parzen weights, truncation lag= 60
Dependent variable is DIF1
778 observations used for estimation from    1 to  778
Regressor Coefficient Standard Error T-Ratio[Prob]
C .42956 .31083 1.3819[.167]
N .029760 .0074509 3.9941[.000]
F -.095096 .069432 -1.3696[.171]
NF -.0065412 .0016501 -3.9642[.000]
DIF2 -.65030 .17623 -3.6901[.000]
NDIF2 .0079491 .0020844 3.8136[.000]
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APPENDIX 8.
Table A8. Correlation of the weekly returns of GKO-OFZ indices
1/96-6/97 RESI RTBI OFZ GKO7 GKO3
0
GKO9
0
RESI 1 0.08 0.05 0.01 0.04 0.08
RTBI 0.08 1 0.88 0.71 0.94 0.98
OFZ 0.05 0.88 1 0.60 0.81 0.89
GKO7 0.01 0.71 0.60 1 0.82 0.60
GKO30 0.04 0.94 0.81 0.82 1 0.88
GKO90 0.08 0.98 0.89 0.60 0.88 1
1/96-9/96 RESI RTBI OFZ GKO7 GKO3
0
GKO9
0
RESI 1 0.11 0.04 0.07 0.08 0.10
RTBI 0.11 1 0.90 0.71 0.95 0.98
OFZ 0.04 0.90 1 0.62 0.84 0.90
GKO7 0.07 0.71 0.62 1 0.80 0.60
GKO30 0.08 0.95 0.84 0.80 1 0.89
GKO90 0.10 0.98 0.90 0.60 0.89 1
10/96-6/97 RESI RTBI OFZ GKO7 GKO3
0
GKO9
0
RESI 1 0.02 0.14 -0.15 -0.04 0.04
RTBI 0.02 1 0.81 0.66 0.91 0.99
OFZ 0.14 0.81 1 0.60 0.79 0.81
GKO7 -0.15 0.66 0.60 1 0.86 0.60
GKO30 -0.04 0.91 0.79 0.86 1 0.86
GKO90 0.04 0.99 0.81 0.60 0.86 1
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APPENDIX 9.
Granger causality test for daily returns on investments in the currency, GKO,
and stock markets.
Pairwise Granger Causality Tests
Sample: 1 569
Lags: 2
Null Hypothesis: Obs F-Statistic  Probability
GKOIVAN does not Granger Cause BLCP 435 1.36571 0.25630
BLCP does not Granger Cause GKOIVAN0. 47400 0.62283
RSRTSIN does not Granger Cause BLCP 507 0.05184 0.94948
BLCP does not Granger Cause RSRTSIN 21.8635  7.9E-10
MICEX does not Granger Cause BLCP 450 10.4313  3.7E-05
BLCP does not Granger Cause MICEX 0.91154 0.40265
MB does not Granger Cause BLCP 340 9.71092  7.9E-05
BLCP does not Granger Cause MB  0.88982  0.41170
RESI does not Granger Cause BLCP 454 7.92207 0.00042
BLCP does not Granger Cause RESI 0.24727 0.78103
RTBI does not Granger Cause BLCP 454 0.60224  0.54803
BLCP does not Granger Cause RTBI 0.45155 0.63693
X does not Granger Cause BLCP 435 1.36571 0.25630
BLCP does not Granger Cause X 2.55979 0.07850
MICEX does not Granger Cause GKOIVAN 435 0.28180 0.75456
GKOIVAN does not Granger Cause MICEX 4.13121 0.01671
MB does not Granger Cause GKOIVAN 326 6.87637 0.00119
GKOIVAN does not Granger Cause MB 0.62935 0.53359
RESI does not Granger Cause GKOIVAN 435 0.28036  0.75565
GKOIVAN does not Granger Cause RESI  2.57995 0.07695
RTBI does not Granger Cause GKOIVAN 435 83.1687 0.00000
GKOIVAN does not Granger Cause RTBI 6.36002 0.00190
X does not Granger Cause GKOIVAN 435 0.47400  0.62283
GKOIVAN does not Granger Cause X 2.55979 0.07850
MICEX does not Granger Cause RSRTSIN 450 6.88076 0.00114
RSRTSIN does not Granger Cause MICEX 2.52071 0.08155
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MB does not Granger Cause RSRTSIN 340 8.89922 0.00017
RSRTSIN does not Granger Cause MB 0.70455 0.49506
RESI does not Granger Cause RSRTSIN 454  25.6522  2.8E-11
RSRTSIN does not Granger Cause RESI 0.12563 0.88197
RTBI does not Granger Cause RSRTSIN 454 0.31117  0.73275
RSRTSIN does not Granger Cause RTBI 0.31457 0.73027
X does not Granger Cause RSRTSIN 435 31.3672 1.9E-13
RSRTSIN does not Granger Cause X 1.41543 0.24395
MB does not Granger Cause MICEX 340 16.1461 2.0E-07
MICEX does not Granger Cause MB 2.58872 0.07662
RESI does not Granger Cause MICEX 450 2.78933 0.06254
MICEX does not Granger Cause RESI 7.18346 0.00085
RTBI does not Granger Cause MICEX 450 3.31776 0.03713
MICEX does not Granger Cause RTBI 0.38803 0.67862
X does not Granger Cause MICEX 435 0.31273 0.73161
MICEX does not Granger Cause X 1.11867  0.32766
RESI does not Granger Cause MB 340 0.03635 0.96431
MB does not Granger Cause RESI 11.4816 1.5E-05
RTBI does not Granger Cause MB 340  0.59215  0.55372
MB does not Granger Cause RTBI   4.93328 0.00773
X does not Granger Cause MB 326 0.46114 0.63098
MB does not Granger Cause X 1.62371 0.19878
RTBI does not Granger Cause RESI 454 1.52754 0.21819
RESI does not Granger Cause RTBI  0.10113  0.90384
X does not Granger Cause RESI 435 3.71395 0.02517
RESI does not Granger Cause X 9.41584 9.9E-05
X does not Granger Cause RTBI 435 0.25596 0.77429
RTBI does not Granger Cause X  3.54440  0.02973
